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Under the Equal Protection Clause, states can’t (with certain excep-
tions) discriminate against noncitizens.  But Congress can.  Sometimes,
Congress tries to share this power to discriminate with states.  This Article
looks at cases in which Congress supports state discrimination using coop-
erative federalism.  (The phrase “cooperative federalism” refers to a form
of lawmaking in which Congress induces or allows states to play a role in
federally-created regulatory schemes.)
For example, multiple provisions of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996
aim to encourage states to deny public benefits to noncitizens.  The Wel-
fare Reform Act attempts to work around the Equal Protection Clause by
sharing with the states Congress’s plenary power to treat noncitizens dif-
ferently.  It thus represents a form of cooperative federalism whose goal is
discrimination.
Cooperative-federalism schemes require the involvement of two ac-
tors, federal and subfederal, each subject to their own legal constraints.  In
the immigration context, discriminatory cooperative federalism is vulnera-
ble to challenges aimed at the federal actions (like claims that Congress
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has impermissibly delegated its power) and challenges aimed at the states’
actions (like equal-protection challenges).  Distinguishing the federal and
state components of these challenges significantly clarifies the analytical
picture, and, for advocates, the plan of attack.
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INTRODUCTION
CAN the federal government share with states its power to discriminateagainst noncitizens?  Courts have puzzled over this question for de-
cades,1 and scholars have attacked it from a variety of angles,2 but no ap-
proach has emerged as dominant.  This Article suggests that there’s good
reason for that: what appears at first glance to be one problem is, in fact,
many.
Federal statutes sometimes purport to authorize states to decide for
themselves whether to offer public benefits and licenses to noncitizens.
Many of the most important provisions in this area are part of the Welfare
Reform Act of 1996, a major piece of legislation that limited noncitizens’
eligibility not only for state and federal public assistance, but also for other
benefits as diverse as professional licenses, public contracts, and higher
education assistance.3
Ordinarily, it would be unconstitutional for states to deny benefits to
noncitizens if they offered those benefits to citizens.  Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, state laws that distinguish between citizens and noncitizens
1. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382–83 (1971); Bruns v. Mayhew,
750 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014); Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2014);
Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1100–08 (9th Cir. 2012); Soskin v. Reinertson,
353 F.3d 1242, 1254–57 (10th Cir. 2004); Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 300 Conn.
412, 416–17 (2011); Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 725–26 (2006); Finch v. Com-
monwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 461 Mass. 232, 233–34 (2012); Doe v.
Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 437 Mass. 521, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407–08 (2002);
Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 12 N.Y.3d 478, 482 (2009); In re Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d
418, 433–34 (2001).
2. See Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation
in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591 (1994); Howard F. Chang,
Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the States, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357 (2002); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV.
387 (1983); Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016) [hereinafter Condon, Equal Protection for Immi-
grants]; Roger C. Hartley; Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: A Sep-
aration of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93 (2007); Gregory T.
W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection Violations in the Structures of State
Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417 (2014); Anna C. Tavis, Healthcare
for All: Ensuring States Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51
B.C. L. REV. 1627 (2010); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001);
David Wurzburg, Legalized Discrimination? Not in My State: State-Court Challenges to the
Discriminatory Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996, 21 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 251 (2014). Note, The Constitutional-
ity of Immigration Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247 (2005) [hereinafter Immigration
Federalism].
3. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(“Welfare Reform Act,” sometimes referred to as “PRWORA”), Pub. L. No. 104-93,
§§ 400–451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261–76 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1666).  For an overview of how states in the years immediately following
the act’s passage responded to the authority to deny benefits that the act granted
them, see Wishnie, supra note 2, at 515–17.  For a discussion of specific benefits,
see Part I below.
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must satisfy strict scrutiny.4  So must state laws that draw a line between
different groups or categories of noncitizens.5  Congress, unlike states, has
the power to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens.6  Statutes like
the Welfare Reform Act try to share that power to discriminate with the
states.  Part I of this Article maps out the different ways in which Congress
attempts to authorize or support discrimination against noncitizens.
Statutory frameworks in which Congress tries to give states discretion
to discriminate, I argue, should be understood as a form of cooperative
federalism.  In traditional cooperative-federalism frameworks, Congress
uses various powers, including preemption and the Spending Clause
power, to induce states to participate in federal programs or regulate in
ways Congress approves of.7  Statutes like the Welfare Reform Act function
similarly, but instead of inducing states to participate in federal programs
or comply with federal standards, they aim to give states discretion that
would otherwise be forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.
Cooperative-federalism schemes involve two sets of actions: the fed-
eral government’s actions that create and maintain the scheme, and the
subfederal governments’ actions that fulfill their role in it.8  Each actor,
the federal and the subfederal, is subject to its own set of legal constraints.
For example, subfederal actors may be subject to limitations under state
4. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219–20 (1984) (citizenship require-
ment for state notaries public is subject to strict scrutiny); Examining Bd. of
Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601–02 (1976); In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642
(1973).
5. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1977).
6. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”).
7. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing Medicaid as
a “system of ‘cooperative federalism’” in which “if a State agrees to establish a
Medicaid plan that satisfies the requirements of Title XIX, which include several
mandatory categories of health services, the Federal Government agrees to pay a
specified percentage of ‘the total amount expended . . . as medical assistance
under the State plan.’” (citation omitted) (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
316 (1968); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(1))); see also Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018) (describing as “cooperative federalism” a regu-
latory scheme in which “Congress enacted a statute that comprehensively regu-
lated surface coal mining and offered States the choice of ‘either implement[ing]’
the federal program ‘or else yield[ing] to a federally administered regulatory pro-
gram.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981) (discussing the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 447, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 & Supp.
III)))).
8. The Ninth Circuit majority in Korab v. Fink criticizes the dissent for seeming
to question both the constitutionality of the state’s action and the constitutionality
of the federal action that authorized it.  Some scholars sometimes confuse the two
analyses: Carrasco, for example, writes that when Congress enacted the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA), it “enunciated no interest that would satisfy
the Court’s heightened review.”  Carrasco, supra note 2, at 616.  But heightened
review applies to state actions, not federal actions.
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constitutions, which can’t bind the federal government.  And the United
States Constitution imposes structural constraints on Congress that are not
relevant to state actions.
This means that cooperative-federalism schemes are subject to two
sets of challenges: those based on constraints that apply to the federal gov-
ernment, and those based on constraints that apply to the subfederal ac-
tors that implement cooperative-federalism schemes.  In the case of
cooperative-federalism schemes intended to enable state discrimination
against noncitizens, we should expect (and this Article explores) a multi-
plicity of potential challenges, not just one.
Whenever Congress supports state discrimination, two actions are re-
quired: the congressional action supporting the state discrimination, and
the state’s action that discriminates.  Both actions are independently sub-
ject to challenges.  And those challenges may be logically independent of
one another.  In other words, even if challenges to the federal act fail,
challenges to the state act may succeed, and vice versa.
Part II of this Article analyzes three challenges that are directed at the
federal role in discriminatory cooperative federalism.  The first challenge
argues that when a federal statute allows states to make different choices
about whether to discriminate against noncitizens, that statute does not
constitute a “uniform” rule, and thus violates a requirement of the United
States Constitution.9  The second challenge argues that statutes like the
Welfare Reform Act don’t deserve judicial deference because they are not
really “immigration” laws at all, in the sense that they don’t regulate move-
ment across borders.  A third challenge argues that the federal power, as-
suming it exists, is nondelegable, and thus statutes like the Welfare
Reform Act impermissibly attempt to share a power that can’t be shared.
Part III of the Article analyzes the most important challenge to the
subfederal role in discriminatory cooperative federalism: the equal-protec-
tion challenge.  Courts have struggled to decide what role, if any, federal
approval should play in equal-protection analysis of state discrimination
against noncitizens.  The analysis in Part II, which outlines several chal-
lenges to Congress’s power to enact discriminatory cooperative-federalism
schemes, lays the groundwork for a clearer understanding of the role fed-
eral approval plays in an equal-protection analysis.  Or so Part III will try to
show.
This case study of discriminatory cooperative federalism sheds some
light on larger debates about the value of cooperative federalism as such.
The Supreme Court has long spoken glowingly about statutory schemes in
which the federal government uses powers like preemption or the Spend-
ing Clause power to create programs in which state and local governments
play an active role.10  On the other hand, some commenters see coopera-
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 630 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[U]ndoubtedly the interests of federalism are better
6
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tive federalism as undermining states by coopting them into participating
in schemes they would not otherwise join; these commenters argue that it
would be better to revert to a “dual federalism” model in which the federal
government and the states regulated in parallel, not together.11
These generalizations assume that cooperative federalism can be
fairly characterized as good or bad intrinsically, or in general.  But the
value of cooperative federalism may depend on the uses to which it is put.
This Article presents a stark example of how the tools of cooperative feder-
alism have been used to accomplish harmful ends.12
I. HOW CONGRESS SUPPORTS STATE DISCRIMINATION
Congress supports discrimination in different ways.  Past scholarly
analyses identified discrete challenges to discriminatory cooperative feder-
alist schemes.13  This Article aims to contribute to that literature by put-
ting the pieces together and showing the multiplicity of challenges to such
schemes.  Congressional support for state discrimination gives rise to
problems in multiple doctrinal categories: equal protection, federal pre-
emption, state sovereignty, judicial independence, and more.  So there are
multiple rules or analyses that might govern any challenge to a specific
statute that supports state discrimination.
What is needed, to lay the groundwork for clear understanding, is
taxonomy: first, a taxonomy of the ways in which Congress supports state
discrimination against noncitizens, and, second, a taxonomy of the chal-
lenges that might be brought against those various forms of support for
state discrimination.
served when States retain a meaningful role in the implementation of a program
of such importance.”); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); Wis.
Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (Medicaid “is
designed to advance cooperative federalism” (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
308 (1980))); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557
(2000).
12. The word “discrimination” can be used descriptively or normatively.  In its
descriptive sense, it indicates the mere fact of differential treatment, with no im-
plied value-judgment about whether the differential treatment is appropriate.  In
its normative sense, “discrimination” connotes a practice that is morally wrong.  In
this Article, the word is generally used in both senses: I do in fact hold, and might
as well disclose, the belief that the differential treatment at issue is wrong.  How-
ever, a reader who does not share that belief might still be persuaded by the argu-
ments to follow.  The Article’s goal is to show why existing legal doctrine supports
multiple strong challenges to congressional actions designed to authorize or justify
states’ differential treatment of noncitizens.  Even someone who supports that dif-
ferential treatment as a policy matter might recognize doctrinal problems with it.
13. For example, Wishnie explains why such schemes represent an impermis-
sible devolution of power to the states, while Condon argues that equal-protection
doctrine (once it is appropriately disentangled from preemption doctrine) bars
state discrimination. See Wishnie, supra note 2, at 493; Condon, Equal Protection for
Immigrants, supra note 2, at 77–78.
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A. The Tools Congress Can Use to Support State Discrimination
Congress uses various tools, powers, or mechanisms to support or en-
courage state discrimination.  This Section of the Article looks at three:
cooperative federalism; the plenary-power doctrine, under which courts
give extreme deference to Congress on immigration matters; and the indi-
rect effects of federal schemes.
1. The Plenary Power
One tool that makes it possible for Congress to support discrimina-
tion against noncitizens is its so-called “plenary power” over matters re-
lated to immigration.14  Under the plenary-power doctrine, federal courts
give extreme deference to Congress and the President on questions of
immigration policy.  As Justice Frankfurter wrote, “[T]he underlying poli-
cies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to enter and what classes of
aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively to determine
even though such determination may be deemed to offend American
traditions . . . .”15
A long series of Supreme Court cases upheld the power in the context
of regulation of exclusion and removal from the United States.16  And the
14. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitu-
tion, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 10 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of
Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925
(1995); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phan-
tom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [here-
inafter Motomura, Plenary Power]; cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine?  A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitu-
tional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000) (questioning the idea that
the idea of a plenary-power doctrine is necessary to explain Supreme Court
precedent).
15. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (discussed in Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 10).
16. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305–06 (1993) (deferential review of de-
tention of noncitizens during immigration proceedings); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977) (admission: “[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power
of Congress more complete.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (exclusion); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (procedures); Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580 (deportation);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (procedures:
“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sover-
eignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sover-
eign powers delegated by the constitution, the right to its exercise at any time
when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it,
cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”).  The doctrine thus
leaves to Executive Branch agencies significant responsibility for the application of
constitutional norms, but they have not lived up to that responsibility. See Alina
Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 486
(2018).  Some scholars saw the cases of Zavydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 688 (2001), and
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), as a partial retreat from the plenary-power doc-
8
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Court also applied plenary-power deference to decisions about federal
public benefits in Mathews v. Diaz.17  Exploring this trend, Kerry Abrams
has documented ways in which the Supreme Court has used the plenary-
power doctrine not only to uphold federal laws against equal-protection
challenges, but also to find state laws affecting noncitizens preempted.18
The rationale for the doctrine has to do with immigration’s centrality
in foreign relations, and the deference traditionally afforded the executive
and legislative branches in foreign-relations matters.19  In the early case of
Chy Lung v. Freeman,20 the Court said that only the federal government
could exercise power over immigration because “[i]f it be otherwise, a sin-
gle State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other
nations.”21  And in Diaz the Court wrote that “[a]ny rule of constitutional
law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of govern-
ment to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only
with the greatest caution.”22  It then cited Baker v. Carr,23 on non-justicia-
ble political questions,24 and wrote that “[t]he reasons that preclude judi-
cial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigra-
tion and naturalization.”25  In a related context, the Supreme Court has
trine. See Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339
(2002).  The recent case of Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017)
points in the same direction, applying intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based clas-
sification in the law of citizenship. See id. at 1698. But see Carrie Rosenbaum, Immi-
gration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of Plenary Power, 28 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 118, 152 (2018) (“In spite of some signs of a departure from the plenary
power doctrine, the Court still gives significant deference to Congress in the area
of immigration law.” (footnote omitted)).  The plenary-power doctrine came roar-
ing back (if indeed it had ever gone anywhere) in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018), which upheld the Trump Administration’s ban on entry from certain pri-
marily Muslim countries against a First Amendment challenge, despite statements
by the President that nakedly described his anti-Muslim bias as the reason for the
ban. Id. at 2418.  It explicitly invoked the plenary-power doctrine in doing so. Id.
at 2419.
17. See 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
18. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013).
19. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 796 (discussing foreign-affairs rationale for plenary
power); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (“The power of Congress over
the admission of aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touch-
ing as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign
relations and the national security.”); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; see also David
S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 81, 145 (2013) (discussing criticism of the foreign-affairs rationale);
Spiro, supra note 16, at 340 (“The inherent international element of immigration
decisionmaking perhaps best explains the origins of the plenary power doctrine
and its persistence through the rights revolution in other contexts.”).
20. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
21. Id. at 280.
22. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81.
23. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
24. Id. at 217.
25. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81–82.
9
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noted that “[p]erceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may
lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.”26  The
Court reasoned that fifty-one actors in this arena would be too many: “It is
fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and
security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and
communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 sepa-
rate States.”27
The plenary-power doctrine functions as a peculiar carve-out from
equal-protection doctrine.28  Scholars have long attacked the plenary-
power doctrine, placing it firmly in “a sort of constitutional hall of
shame.”29  In particular, they have criticized the foreign-affairs rationale.
Gerald Neuman, for example, wryly wondered how our foreign affairs
might have been disrupted had the Court struck down in Fiallo v. Bell 30
rules that discriminated on the basis of gender and illegitimacy in the
granting of immigration status.31  Peter Margulies has proposed an ap-
proach to judicial review of federal immigration policies under which
courts would examine, among other factors, the “degree of sovereign in-
terest” in any specific policy.32  Hardly anyone in academia is a fan of the
current approach.  Nonetheless, it works in conjunction with the tools of
cooperative federalism to make possible federal support for state discrimi-
nation against noncitizens.
The plenary power allows Congress to simply command states to deny
benefits to noncitizens.33  Conceptually, this may not amount to state dis-
crimination, because it is arguably the federal government that discrimi-
26. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (discussing preemption
of state laws that affect immigration); see also id. (“Immigration policy can affect
trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well
as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full
protection of its laws.”).
27. Id.
28. See Jenny-Brooke Condon, Equal Protection Exceptionalism, 69 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 563, 575 (2017) [hereinafter Condon, Equal Protection Exceptionalism].
29. See Spiro, supra note 16, at 340.  For criticism of the doctrine, see, e.g.,
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 118–38 (1996).  Catherine Kim shows how the doctrine can be
attacked from the perspective of administrative law (as opposed to equal protec-
tion), as part of a movement toward greater judicial scrutiny of agency action.
Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77
(2017) (describing a project of “contextualizing the judiciary’s willingness to re-
view immigration decisions within a broader administrative law project to
strengthen judicial checks on the growing authority of agency officials across the
regulatory state”).
30. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
31. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1898 (1993).
32. Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration
Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 8 (2018).
33. In cases where federal statutes command a denial of benefits, courts typi-
cally apply rational basis scrutiny. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d
Cir. 2001); Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000); City of Chi-
10
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nates when it denies states all choice in the matter.  Nonetheless, it is
important that Congress can simply prohibit states from treating nonci-
tizens equally.  Cooperative-federalism schemes are an alternative to out-
right commands of that kind.
2. Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative-federalism schemes are another important tool Congress
can use to support state discrimination against noncitizens.  Cooperative
federalism is itself a collection of tools.  Two of the most important are
conditional grants and conditional preemption.  These can be thought of
as a carrot and a stick, respectively.34
Conditional grants are the carrot: if states participate in a given fed-
eral scheme, Congress (using its power under the Spending Clause) gives
those states money.35  Conditional preemption is the stick: if states fail to
participate in the federal scheme, the states are preempted and not al-
lowed to exercise regulatory power in the relevant area.36  Both mecha-
nisms involve inducing states to act, rather than compelling them to do so.
The reason for calling these laws cooperative federalism is that they in-
cago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 603–05 (7th Cir. 1999); Rodriguez v. United States,
169 F.3d 1342, 1346–50 (11th Cir. 1999).
34. Cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power,
and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 205–06 (1997) (“‘[C]ooperative federal-
ism’ comes in many forms.  Congress may: (1) use federal funds as a ‘carrot’ to
induce states to  regulate; [or] (2) require federal agencies to impose the ‘stick’ of
preemptive federal requirements if states do not regulate as desired”; also discuss-
ing constitutional concerns with other forms in which Congress may “(3) delegate
federal powers to states” or “(4) direct states to implement federal programs”).
Another form of cooperative federalism is one in which states are given a
voice in a federal decision-making process.  Section 401 of the Clean Water Act
creates a process for state involvement in federal agencies’ decisions about
whether to approve projects that might result in discharges of pollutants into navi-
gable waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2018).  Before the federal agency can
approve such a project, the relevant state must certify that it will comply with “efflu-
ent limitations” and “any other appropriate requirements of State law.” Id.
§ 1341(d). See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Clean Water Act Section 401
Water Quality Certification: A Water Quality Protection Tool for States and Tribes (2010),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML112160635.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3BBW-VZ6K] (subject to review under Executive Order on Promoting Energy Infrastruc-
ture and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10,
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-promot-
ing-energy-infrastructure-economic-growth/ [https://perma.cc/234P-LUPH].
35. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (under Congress’s
spending power, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds”).
36. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).
For an overview of cooperative federalism, and the cases that have upheld it, see
Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79
N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–77 (2001).
11
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volve “a shared federal and state government responsibility for standard
setting, funding, and enforcement.”37
Discriminatory cooperative federalism uses both carrots and sticks.
One example of a carrot is Medicaid, a program jointly funded by the
federal government and the states, which is governed by federal rules.38
Congress sets conditions of eligibility for this program that treat citizens
and noncitizens differently.  The federal funds at issue are an enormous
incentive for states to participate against noncitizens, and thus to
discriminate.39
An example of a stick is 8 U.S.C. § 1621, a statute I’ll call “the Benefits
Bar,” which conditionally preempts states that wish to offer public benefits
to certain noncitizens.  First, the Benefits Bar provides that states cannot
offer public benefits to noncitizens unless their immigration status is on a
list of eligible statuses.40  For any noncitizen who can’t find their status on
37. John D. Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Pro-
tection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TUL. L. REV. 299,
299 (1983).
38. Medicaid: An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.every
crsreport.com/files/20150803_R43357_3f72428cda68b780d876e71160397a398e18
2b7a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AAV-LMV3].
39. Medicaid is such a massive program that the threatened loss of Medicaid
funds was found unacceptably coercive in National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–82 (2012).
40. That list includes “qualified aliens,” a category that includes legal perma-
nent residents, asylees, refugees, and other humanitarian statuses. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1641 (2018).  The list also includes nonimmigrants and certain parolees.  8
U.S.C. § 1621(a), (c) (2018).  Who is a “nonimmigrant”?  Generally, the term is
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15), which describes temporary or conditional sta-
tuses like student visas, temporary work visas, and others.  But Jennesa Calvo-Fried-
man points out that the version of section 1621 that was passed by Congress, and
published in the Statutes at Large, “defines eligible nonimmigrants as ‘a nonimmi-
grant under the Immigration and Nationality Act.’”  Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, The
Uncertain Terrain of State Occupational Licensing Laws for Noncitizens: A Preemption
Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1597, 1626 (2014).  The U.S. Code version adds bracketed
text suggesting that the term “nonimmigrant” is limited to the statuses listed in 8
U.S.C. § 1101: “a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.].”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)(2) (2018).  Calvo-Friedman uses this ob-
servation to argue that the term “nonimmigrant” thus includes not only those
listed in section 1101, but all lawfully present noncitizens who are not lawful per-
manent residents.  Calvo-Friedman, supra, at 1627.  A response to this argument
might be that if Congress meant to include all lawfully present noncitizens in the
category “nonimmigrant,” it would not have needed to separately list as eligible
“an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such
Act [8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)] for less than one year.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)(3) (2018).
To be sure, Calvo-Friedman’s reading renders that provision hard to explain.  But
her reading elegantly explains a different, otherwise-inexplicable feature of the
statute: the fact that section 1621(d) authorizes states to grant eligibility (by enact-
ment of a state law after 1996) to “an alien who is not lawfully present in the United
States” but not a noncitizen who is lawfully present. Id. § 1621(d) (emphasis ad-
ded).  Why would Congress have wanted to allow states to give benefits to unlaw-
fully present people, but not lawfully present people in statuses like Temporary
Protected Status that fall into none of the eligible categories listed in section
1621(a)?  Calvo-Friedman’s reading solves this problem by reading section 1621(a)
12
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this list, the federal statute bars states from offering a wide variety of bene-
fits, including grants, contracts, loans, professional and commercial li-
censes, retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, and unemployment benefits.41
But there is an exception: states may provide benefits on this list to other-
wise ineligible noncitizens if they do so by the enactment of a state law.42
In other words, states are preempted from offering benefits unless they do
so in a way that satisfies Congress’s criteria.
This may not feel very cooperative; Congress is essentially forcing
states to regulate in a given way.  But this is true in many instances of
“cooperative” federalism: state regulatory schemes are wiped from the
field unless they satisfy congressional standards.  The Benefits Bar may be
particularly objectionable because of the kind of conditions it imposes; in
a previous article, I developed an argument that the Benefits Bar is uncon-
stitutional because it unduly intrudes on the working of states’ govern-
ment processes.43  In general, however, the idea of congressionally
imposed conditions states must satisfy to avoid preemption is well-
accepted.
Another reason why provisions like the Benefits Bar may not feel “co-
operative” is that cooperative-federalism schemes are typically designed to
encourage states to participate in the schemes.  The purpose of offering
federal matching funds in the Medicaid program, for example, is to en-
courage states to participate.  But the purpose of the Benefits Bar is more
likely to discourage states from acting at all.  The Benefits Bar is part of the
Welfare Reform Act, which was built on the assumption that the United
States would be better off if “aliens within the Nation’s borders [did] not
depend on public resources to meet their needs.”44  Its purpose is ex-
to confer eligibility on all lawfully present people.  As noted below in note 42,
there is an alternative solution to the problem of why the statute appears to allow
states to offer benefits to unlawfully present noncitizens but not lawfully present
ones: the New York Court of Appeals held that despite its text, the statute “obvi-
ously” authorizes benefits for lawfully present noncitizens.  Aliessa v. Novello, 96
N.Y.2d 418, 426 (2001).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1) (2018).
42. Id. § 1621(d) (2018).  The New York Court of Appeals held that the stat-
ute “obviously” authorizes benefits for lawfully present noncitizens. Aliessa, 96
N.Y.2d at 426.  The court noted that “[s]ection 1621(d) refers to [s]tate authority
to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens,” but held that “the statute obviously autho-
rizes the State to provide State Medicaid to PRUCOLs.” Id. at 426 n.9.  The term
“PRUCOLs” here refers to people “permanently residing in the United States
under color of law”—a term which the Court of Appeals had defined to include
“aliens of whom the INS is aware, but has no plans to deport.” Id. at 422 n.2.
Because the plaintiffs in that case included “PRUCOLs,” this portion of the opin-
ion was holding, not dicta.
43. Ava Ayers, Federalism and the Right to Decide Who Decides, 63 VILL. L. REV. 567
(2018).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A) (2018); see Michael Fix and Ron Haskins, Welfare
Benefits for Non-Citizens, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 2, 2002), https://www.brookings
.edu/research/welfare-benefits-for-non-citizens/ [https://perma.cc/6HMP-
13
Ayers: Discriminatory Cooperative Federalism
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
14 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 1
pressed in the title of the relevant chapter of the United States Code: “Re-
stricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens.”45
Even though the Benefits Bar aims at state inaction rather than state
action, it is still “cooperative” in the sense that it aims to elicit federal-state
cooperation in the pursuit of a common policy goal.  In this case, the goal
is to deny public benefits to noncitizens, and thereby to treat them differ-
ently from citizens.
B. The Forms of Congressional Support for Discrimination
Now that we’ve reviewed the tools Congress uses to create statutes that
support state discrimination, we can look at the forms those statutes take.
I’ll cover three: giving states discretion; giving states conditional discre-
tion; and prescribing the judicial standard of review.
1. Giving States Discretion
Some federal laws say only that states may discriminate against nonci-
tizens in the provision of certain benefits.  8 U.S.C. § 1624 says that states
are “authorized to prohibit or otherwise limit or restrict the eligibility of
aliens or classes of aliens for programs of general cash public assistance.”46
Using similar language, 8 U.S.C. § 1622 says that “a State is authorized to
determine the eligibility for any State public benefits of an alien who is a
qualified alien.”  (The phrase “qualified alien” is a defined term of art,
encompassing several major categories of noncitizens, including legal per-
manent residents.47)  Yet another provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, creates a
one-year window during which certain noncitizens can apply for lawful sta-
tus,48 then says that states “may . . . provide that the alien is not eligible”
for certain state public benefits.49
Provisions governing Medicaid take a similar form.50  Medicaid is “a
cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial
M3RH] (“One of the more contentious issues in the 1996 welfare reform debate
was whether the federal government should provide welfare benefits to non-citi-
zens who are legal residents of the United States.”).
45. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1646 (2018).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1624(a) (2018).  The state denial of benefits must not be “more
restrictive than the prohibitions, limitations, or restrictions imposed under compa-
rable Federal programs.” Id. § 1624(b).
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2018).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(1)(A) (2018).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(1)(B) (2018).  The statute also disqualifies those who
legalize under the provision from eligibility for federal benefits for five years. Id.
§ 1255a(h)(1)(A).
50. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 435.406 (2019) (noncitizen eligibility for Medi-
caid).  For a convenient chart showing noncitizens’ eligibility for various federal
and joint federal/state programs, see Chart of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Pro-
grams, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/immigrant-eligibility-
for-federal-programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/ST7J-YX63] (last visited Apr. 12,
2020).
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assistance to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to
needy persons.”51  The program, one scholar writes, “is fixed in the collec-
tive consciousness as a classic example of cooperative federalism.”52  If
states establish plans that satisfy federal requirements, including require-
ments about what health services must be offered, then the federal govern-
ment will pay a percentage of the total amount spent.53  Medicaid “does
not obligate a participating State to pay for those medical services for
which federal reimbursement is unavailable.”54  States are authorized to
determine the eligibility of “qualified aliens” for Medicaid.55  (There is,
however, a five-year bar on benefits from which states may not opt out.56)
Likewise, states may choose whether to provide benefits under the Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program (another jointly funded program57) to
noncitizen children or pregnant women58 (subject to the same five-year
bar59).  All of these statutes function by purporting to give states a choice
about whether to discriminate.
Some provisions allow states no discretion so long as they participate
in the federal program (and accept federal funds).  For example, states
receive federal support for unemployment-insurance programs as long as
51. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018)
(appropriating funds for “making payments to States which have submitted . . .
State plans for medical assistance”).
52. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 434
(2011) (footnote omitted).
53. Harris, 448 U.S. at 308 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(1) (2018)).
54. Id. at 309.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) allows states to determine qualified aliens’ eligibil-
ity for Medicaid, “except as provided in [8 U.S.C. § 1613].”  Section 1613, in turn,
bars qualified aliens from receiving Medicaid or any other “Federal means-tested
public benefit” for five years after entering one of the “qualified alien” statuses. Id.
§ 1613(a).  There are multiple exceptions to both of these rules, but they’re not
relevant here.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2018).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–1397mm (2018); see State Children’s Health Insurance
Program, BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/607 [https://perma.cc/
ZC8A-QTRL] (last visited Feb. 10, 2019); Alison Mitchell, Federal Financing for the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), CONG. RES. SERV. (May 23, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43949.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG6W-YLE4]; see
also State Children’s Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care and
Other Health Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956, 61,956 (Oct. 2,
2002) (“Benefits under SCHIP are jointly financed by the Federal and State gov-
ernments and are administered by the States.  Within broad Federal guidelines,
each State determines the design of its program, eligibility groups, benefit pack-
ages, payment levels for coverage, and administrative and operating procedures.”).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397aa(a) (2018). See Fatma Marouf, Alien-
age Classifications and the Denial of Health Care to Dreamers, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1271,
1281 (2016) (“The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of
2009 (‘CHIPRA’) gives states the option of providing Medicaid or CHIP to chil-
dren and/or pregnant women who are ‘lawfully residing’ in the United States and
otherwise meet the criteria for these benefits.” (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A)
(2014), 1397aa(a) (2014))).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2018).
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they comply with requirements set by Congress.60  One of those require-
ments is that states deny benefits to undocumented people.61  This is not a
grant of discretion in the same sense as the provisions discussed above;
states that participate in the cooperative program don’t have a choice
about whether to deny benefits to undocumented people.  They do, how-
ever, have a choice about whether to participate in the program at all.
Their discretion is thus more limited; it can be exercised in favor of the
undocumented only at a high cost.  Nonetheless, it is still discretion,
rather than an outright federal ban.
2. Discretion with Conditions
Some statutes, rather than giving states unconditioned discretion, say
states may treat noncitizens equally if the states fulfill certain conditions.
These conditions might be substantive: one statutory provision says that
states can only offer post-secondary education benefits to unlawfully pre-
sent people if the same benefits are available to citizens.62  Or they might
be procedural: another provision says that states can offer benefits to un-
lawfully present people only if the state enacts a statute after 1996 explic-
itly offering the benefit.63  In each case, Congress purports to give the
states discretion while limiting the conditions under which they will be
permitted to exercise that discretion.
3. Prescribing the Standard of Review
Finally, one provision of the Welfare Reform Act attempts to dictate
to courts the standard of review that should apply if states discriminate
against noncitizens; it also attempts to dictate the outcome of review
under that standard.64  According to this provision, if a state chooses to
mirror the federal eligibility scheme (that is, to give noncitizens state pub-
lic benefits comparable to the equivalent federal public benefits) then that
state “shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means availa-
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2018); see also Esparza
v. Valdez, 862 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1988); Ibarra v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 823
F.2d 873, 874–75 (5th Cir. 1987); Brambila v. Bd. of Review, N.J. Dep’t of Labor &
Indus., 124 N.J. 425, 431 (1991).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (2018).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2018).  The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully
present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence
within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education
benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such
a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to
whether the citizen or national is such a resident.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2018).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2018).
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ble for achieving the compelling governmental interest of assuring that
aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy.”65
Although for the most part I will defer until later in the Article any
constitutional analysis of the statutes laid out in this section, it’s hard to
resist noting how screamingly unconstitutional this provision is. City of
Boerne v. Flores,66 a decision handed down the year after the Welfare Re-
form Act took effect, held that Congress exceeds its powers when it at-
tempts to prescribe a standard of review that would determine whether the
Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, because Congress lacks the
power “to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restric-
tions on the States.”67  The language quoted above not only attempts to
dictate the standard of review, but also the outcome; it is thus much less
acceptable than what City of Boerne rejected.
The two major forms of discriminatory-cooperative federalism with
which we should be concerned, then, are statutes that give states discre-
tion and conditional discretion to discriminate.  The rest of this Article
will examine grounds on which such statutes might be challenged.  As I
explained above, cooperative-federalism schemes involve state and federal
actions which can be challenged on separate grounds.  So the next section
of the Article begins with challenges to the federal role, and the last sec-
tion considers challenges directed at states.
II. CHALLENGING CONGRESS’S ROLE IN DISCRIMINATORY
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
To analyze congressional support for state discrimination, we’ll begin
with challenges to the congressional actions that form part of discrimina-
tory cooperative-federalism schemes.  Here, the question is whether Con-
gress can lawfully act to support the state’s act of discrimination, not
whether the states can lawfully act under whatever authority Congress
confers.
A. The Uniformity Challenge
The first challenge I’ll discuss is an argument specific to the immigra-
tion context: the argument that when Congress takes action on immigra-
tion, it must do so in a uniform national policy.
The Naturalization Clause gives Congress the power to “establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”68  When Congress authorizes the states to
make discretionary decisions about how to treat noncitizens, the results
will generally not be uniform.  Thus, any statute that authorizes such a
patchwork is arguably not a “uniform rule.”  And there is case law that
65. Id.
66. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
67. Id. at 519.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
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supports the idea that Congress violates the uniform rule requirement
when it gives states the power to make discretionary decisions.
In Graham v. Richardson,69 the Supreme Court struck down a state law
that denied welfare benefits to noncitizens (but not citizens) for two rea-
sons: the state law violated the right to equal protection; and it was pre-
empted.70  After explaining those two holdings, the Court went on to
reject the state’s argument that its law was authorized by a federal
statute.71
The federal statute at issue in Graham involved federal grants that sup-
ported state welfare benefits.  The statute essentially said if states wanted to
receive the federal grants, they couldn’t impose “[a]ny citizenship require-
ment which excludes any citizen of the United States.”72  By requiring the
inclusion of citizens, did the statute implicitly authorize the exclusion of
noncitizens?  The Court declined to read this statute to affirmatively au-
thorize state discrimination.  It noted the principle that “statutes should
be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality.”73
And it said:
Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause . . . .  Under Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress’ power is to “establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  A congressional enactment
construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent
laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally sup-
ported welfare programs would appear to contravene this explicit
constitutional requirement of uniformity.74
To avoid the constitutional uniformity problem, Graham interpreted the
federal statute as not authorizing the discriminatory state law.75
69. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
70. Id. at 376 (“[W]e hold that a state statute that denies welfare benefits to
resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have not resided in the
United States for a specified number of years violate the Equal Protection
Clause.”); id. at 380 (“State alien residency requirements that either deny welfare
benefits to noncitizens or condition them on longtime residency, equate with the
assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance and abode.
Since such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power, they are constitutionally
impermissible.”).
71. Id. at 380.
72. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1971) (current version at § 1352(b)
(2018))).  The federal statute said that the federal agency “shall not approve any
[state] plan which imposes, as a condition of eligibility for aid to the permanently
and totally disabled under the plan . . . [a]ny citizenship requirement which ex-
cludes any citizen of the United States.” Id.  The provision still contains the same
language.
73. Id. at 382–83 (quoting United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971)).
74. Id. at 382 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 383.
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A decade later, the Court again referenced the uniformity require-
ment in Plyler v. Doe,76 which found that a Texas statute violated equal
protection by denying an education to unlawfully present children.77  In
doing so, the Court rejected (in a footnote) the argument that unlawfully
present noncitizens are a “suspect class.”78  To this footnote it added lan-
guage noting that states cannot create immigration laws or policy.79
“But,” wrote the Court, “if the Federal Government has by uniform rule pre-
scribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an
alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction.”80
It isn’t clear what the Court meant by “follow the federal direction”; if
the Court meant that Congress can give states the discretion to adopt dif-
fering standards, then its language seems to contradict Graham.  If Plyler
merely meant to observe that states can follow Congress’s instructions (in
other words, comply with statutes that use outright preemption to dictate
states’ behavior), then this dictum is uncontroversial.
In 2001, the New York Court of Appeals applied Graham to hold that
the Welfare Reform Act violates the uniformity requirement.  The state
law at issue in that case, Aliessa v. Novello,81 limited state-funded Medicaid
benefits for certain noncitizens.82
The New York court began by framing the question as a challenge to
the federal statute.  “[T]he issue,” according to the court, was “not
whether the State has followed [Congress’s] authorization,” but “whether
title IV [of the Welfare Reform Act] can constitutionally authorize New
York to determine for itself the extent to which it will discriminate against
legal aliens.”83  In other words, the court resolved a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the federal statute before addressing any challenges to the
constitutionality of the state law.
Aliessa invoked “Graham’s requirement for uniformity in immigration
policy,” holding that “Title IV does not impose a uniform immigration rule
for States to follow.”84  Because the Welfare Reform Act allows states a
choice about whether to afford benefits, “the States are free to discrimi-
nate in either direction—producing not uniformity, but potentially wide
variation based on localized or idiosyncratic concepts of largesse, econom-
76. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 219 n.19.
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added) (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
81. 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001).
82. Id. at 427 (discussing N.Y. SOC. SERVS. LAW § 122).
83. Id. at 433 (“Plaintiffs contend, however, that the issue is not whether the
State has followed the authorization.  Rather, it is whether [the Welfare Reform
Act] can constitutionally authorize New York to determine for itself the extent to
which it will discriminate against legal aliens for State Medicaid eligibility.  Plain-
tiffs argue that it cannot, and we agree.”).
84. Id. at 434–35.
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ics and politics.”85  After concluding that the federal statute was unconsti-
tutional, Aliessa applied strict scrutiny to the state law, just as it would have
applied strict scrutiny to any discriminatory state law in the absence of
federal authorization.86
The relationship between equal protection and uniformity can be
perplexing, but the way Aliessa handled it makes sense.  Before deciding
whether a federal statute has any effect on a claim that a state law violates
the right to equal protection, a court should first hear any challenges that
directly impugn the constitutionality of the federal statute.  If the federal
statute is unconstitutional, the court can treat the case as if no federal
statute existed, meaning that the state is in the same position it would have
been in without any federal statute: subject to strict scrutiny.87
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, have rejected uniformity
challenges to provisions of the Welfare Reform Act.88  These courts, as
well as scholars, have made four major arguments against the uniformity
challenge: a historical argument about the purpose of the Uniformity
Clause; an argument that granting discretion is a uniform policy; an argu-
ment that patchworks are inevitable; and an argument that the uniformity
requirement applies to naturalization, but not to immigration more
broadly.
The first response to the uniformity challenge is a historical and pur-
posive one.  The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Soskin v. Reinertson89 argues
that the purpose of the Uniformity Clause was merely to avoid a problem
that arose under the Articles of Confederation, in which one state, having
laxer citizenship requirements than its neighbor, could grant citizenship,
which the neighboring state would then be required to honor.90 In other
85. Id. at 435.  The Pennsylvania Attorney General, in a 1996 opinion,
reached the same conclusion: that the Welfare Reform Act violates the uniformity
requirement, as Graham construed it, because the act “allows each individual state
to determine the eligibility of its resident aliens for state welfare benefits.”  Pa.
Att’y Gen. Op. No. 96-1, 1996 Pa. AG LEXIS 2, *21–22 (finding unconstitutional
section 412 of the Welfare Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1622, because “[r]ather than
prescribing a ‘uniform’ rule, [it] allows each individual state to determine the eli-
gibility of its resident aliens for state welfare benefits”).
86. Id. at 435–36.
87. Condon has a different understanding of the uniformity doctrine; she
writes that it:
[I]s not really a delegation doctrine, but a supremacy one.  That is, when
courts accept that Congress has created a uniform immigration rule for
states to follow, they are really concluding that Congress has set immigra-
tion policy, which the Supremacy Clause requires states to follow; they are
not ruling that Congress has shared (or devolved) immigration rulemak-
ing power so that the states may set their own immigration law.
Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 108.
88. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 582 (9th Cir. 2014); Soskin v. Reinertson,
353 F.3d 1242, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2004).
89. 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004).
90. Id. at 1257; see also Korab, 797 at 580–81; cf. Immigration Federalism, supra
note 2, at 2259 (“The historical evidence thus supports a narrow reading of the
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words, a state might be theoretically free to deny citizenship to a certain
individual, but in practice the state would be required to honor a neigh-
boring state’s grant of citizenship, which would effectively nullify the
state’s supposed discretion and allow the state with the most generous citi-
zenship standards to set national citizenship policy.
It is apparently true that the purpose of the Uniformity Clause was to
ensure that states did not adopt divergent naturalization standards.91  But
why should that mean, as the Tenth Circuit seems to think, that the Uni-
formity Clause allows divergent standards for public benefits?  To be sure,
if we define the problem the clause addresses at a low level of generality,
we might call it divergent standards on naturalization (i.e., citizenship).92
But we might just as easily say, at a higher level of generality, that the
problem the Framers saw was divergent standards on the status of nonci-
tizens.  In other words, we might say that the problem was states adopting
immigration-related policies that affected other states.  And then again, at
an even higher level of generality, we could say that the problem the Fram-
ers encountered was the very fact of state regulation of immigration.
A broader interpretation of the Framers’ concerns (that is, one that
expresses the concern at a higher level of generality, as a concern about
divergent state regulations of immigration) seems more faithful to Su-
preme Court precedent.  As the Supreme Court recently noted in a back-
ground discussion of immigration preemption, “It is fundamental that
foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on
this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”93
Why, then, should we read the uniformity rule to address a narrow prob-
lem, rather than the broader problem of subjecting foreign nationals to a
patchwork of regulation? Soskin offers no good reason to limit the Uni-
formity Clause to a narrow, specific context.
A second response to the uniformity challenge is to argue that when
Congress grants states discretion, it does create a uniform national policy.
This is what the Ninth Circuit held in Korab v. Fink.94  “[A]lthough the
‘particulars’ are different in different states, the basic operation of the
Welfare Reform Act is uniform throughout the United States.”95  The idea
is that states everywhere have discretion; they are uniformly given discre-
tion; thus, although the results may be different, the rule is uniform.  (We
uniformity requirement, to apply only when one state’s decision to benefit or in-
jure an alien would compel another state to do the same.”).
91. See Michael Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007,
1009–12 (1976).
92. On levels of generality, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Contro-
versy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1063, 1085 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1065 (1990).
93. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012).
94. Korab, 797 F.3d at 581–82.
95. Id. at 581 (citing Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918)).
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might say, analogously, that when I told each of my two daughters that
they could spend twenty dollars at the fair on whatever they liked, I pre-
scribed a uniform purchasing rule, even though one kid left with a stuffed
panda and the other with five pounds of Sour Patch Kids.)
But if a grant of discretion is inherently uniform, what would a non-
uniform policy look like?96 Korab doesn’t specify.  One example, perhaps,
would be a federal statute that said, “No noncitizen in states west of the
Mississippi River shall receive Medicaid benefits.”  But no court of which
I’m aware has argued that this is what the clause means, or that the Fram-
ers saw a need for this kind of rule.
And the argument that grants of discretion are inherently uniform
conflicts with the historical-purpose argument made in Soskin.  If the prob-
lem is divergent state policies, then the focus should be on the outcome,
not the abstract uniformity of the federal statute.  It seems unlikely that
the Framers feared Congress would single out specific states for differen-
tial conferral of power over immigration.
A third response to the uniformity challenge is that it proves too
much, because it is inevitable that states will create a patchwork of differ-
ent rules governing the treatment of noncitizens.  And this is clearly true;
Howard Chang (writing about preemption, not uniformity) has illustrated
how, given the diversity of ways in which states exercise their police pow-
ers, it is unrealistic to think that we could avoid a patchwork of state regu-
lation affecting immigration.97  For one thing, state criminal law and
marriage-eligibility laws can have an important (and hardly uniform) im-
pact on immigration status, even if the states never directly regulate immi-
gration.98  For another thing, Supreme Court precedent establishes that
states can pass laws that directly affect noncitizens, as long as they comply
with the preemption standards set forth in cases like De Canas v. Bica.99
This argument, however, leaves us nowhere.  It’s true that no “uni-
form rule” will ever govern the treatment of noncitizens in the wide variety
of areas in which states regulate.  But we still need to find some meaning
to impart to the term “uniform” in the Constitution, and knowing that
patchworks are inevitable doesn’t help.
A fourth response to the uniformity challenge is to argue that the
uniformity requirement applies only to naturalization, not to questions of
public benefits or other issues involving the treatment of noncitizens dur-
ing their stay in the United States.  The Constitution refers to a “uniform
rule of naturalization,” not to uniformity more generally.  The federal
power to regulate immigration stems not just from this provision but from
several others.100  If federal power to regulate public benefits for nonci-
96. Hertz, supra note 91, at 1012–13.  As Hertz notes, the term “uniform”
must be construed to add some meaning to the clause. Id.
97. Chang, supra note 2, at 360–61.
98. Id.
99. 424 U.S. 351, 360–61 (1976); see Chang, supra note 2, at 361.
100. See infra notes 190–192 and accompanying text.
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tizens arises not from the Naturalization Clause but from other sources,
then arguably the concept of a “uniform rule” should not be applied to
exercises of power that are based on those other sources.
In Toll v. Moreno,101 the Court said that “Federal authority to regulate
the status of aliens derives from various sources, including the Federal
Government’s power ‘[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,’
its power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations’, and its broad
authority over foreign affairs.”102  Earlier, Chae Chan Ping v. United States103
found that the immigration power is “an incident of sovereignty.”104
These other sources do not support a requirement of uniformity, or so the
argument goes.105
It is not clear, however, that the immigration power can be disaggre-
gated in a way that limits the uniformity requirement to naturalization.
Even if the federal immigration power could be broken apart into separate
components, which one would give rise to the power to regulate state ben-
efits?  None of the other sources of the power are more obvious candidates
for an implied source of power to regulate public benefits.  State public
benefits in particular are not a form of commerce with other nations, or
foreign affairs; nor are they an incident of the United States’ international
sovereignty.  There is therefore no reasonable way to trace the immigra-
tion power to one of those sources more than the Naturalization Clause.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s language in Graham, quoted above,
would have been unnecessary if the uniformity requirement were irrele-
vant. Graham was specifically addressing a federal statute that arguably au-
thorized differential treatment under state public-benefits laws; it had
nothing to do with naturalization.  Thus, it is hard to make a case that the
uniformity requirement doesn’t apply to matters other than
naturalization.
The uniformity challenge, then, is at least a viable one.  If successful,
it (technically speaking) invalidates only the federal component of the dis-
criminatory cooperative-federalism scheme; the state’s component re-
mains to be challenged.  But a challenge to the state’s component will
easily prevail in the absence of a valid federal action, because strict scru-
tiny is the general rule for challenges to discriminatory state laws.  And
even if the uniformity challenge doesn’t succeed, there are other ways to
101. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
102. Id. at 10 (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4; id. cl.
3) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 318 (1936)).
103. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
104. Id. at 609; see also Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of
a republican form of government.”).
105. See Immigration Federalism, supra note 2, at 2260–61.
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challenge the federal component of discriminatory cooperative
federalism.
B. The Argument that This Isn’t Immigration Law
There is a more radical challenge to congressional support for dis-
crimination against noncitizens.  It is a challenge that seems unlikely to
prevail in the Supreme Court now that Justice Kavanaugh has joined it and
apparently stabilized a five-justice conservative majority, but it is a chal-
lenge that is nonetheless worth exploring.  This challenge attempts to
cabin the plenary power, arguing that congressional regulation of public
benefits is not really immigration law at all, and thus deserves none of the
deference afforded to matters like exclusion and removal from the United
States.
As discussed above, the plenary power is as well-established in Su-
preme Court precedent as it is heavily criticized by scholars.106  While
many of the criticisms are directed at the core of the doctrine, others ar-
gue that it has overgrown its boundaries.107  Specifically, scholars like Mat-
thew Lindsay argue that courts should stop lumping together—and giving
the same degree of deference to—regulation of border-crossing (i.e., ad-
mission and removal) and regulation of noncitizens during their stay in
the United States.108  In this context, a distinction is made between “immi-
gration law” and “alienage law.”  “Immigration law” refers to regulation of
issues like who can be admitted to the United States and on what condi-
tions they can be admitted, as well as who should be deported; while
“alienage law” is applied to the treatment of noncitizens.109  Alienage law
includes rules governing noncitizens’ access to education, public benefits,
government employment, and their right to vote.110
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the distinction.  In the pre-
emption case De Canas v. Bica, it said, “[S]tanding alone, the fact that
aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of
immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should or should
not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
106. See supra note 16 (collecting cases).
107. See Abrams, supra note 18, at 619.
108. Matthew Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 179
(2016); see Motomura, Plenary Power, supra note 14, at 547 (“As I use the term,
‘immigration law’ refers to the body of law governing the admission and expulsion
of aliens.  It should be distinguished from the more general law of aliens’ rights
and obligations, which includes, for example, their tax status, military obligations,
and eligibility for government benefits and certain types of employment.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
109. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 341, 360–61 (2008).
110. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition
187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (1994) [hereinafter Motomura, Immigration and
Alienage].
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entrant may remain.”111 De Canas held that a state law dealing with the
employment of undocumented people was not necessarily preempted by
federal power.112  But in its preemption cases, the Court often finds that
alienage regulations are in effect regulations of immigration, in that state
laws affecting noncitizens make it difficult or impossible for those nonci-
tizens to freely immigrate to the states.113
There is undoubtedly a practical overlap between the categories.  As
Clare Huntington notes, for example, “alienage laws barring non-citizens
from certain public benefits likely affect immigration by discouraging
some non-citizens from coming to the United States and encouraging
others to leave.”114  Hiroshi Motomura has even written that a distinction
between immigration law and alienage law “would be more formal than
real.”115
While there is certainly overlap between immigration law and alien-
age law, the overlap is mainly in the effects of the laws, not in the nature of
the laws themselves.  Alienage law affects immigration, and vice versa.  But
it is not terribly difficult to distinguish between immigration and alienage
laws, even though their effects may all “belong to the broader enterprise
of determining who belongs to American society as full members or as
something less.”116
Scholars have also observed that many of the laws admitting nonci-
tizens into the country also impose requirements about what they can do
while they’re here: people admitted on student visas are restricted from
most kinds of work, for example.117  As Wishnie asks, “If employment with-
out INS authorization renders an immigrant deportable and is therefore
‘immigration law,’ why is a direct prohibition on employment of certain
immigrants merely ‘alienage law’?”118  The answer may not be satisfying,
but it isn’t difficult to see: one leads to removability, and the other doesn’t.
111. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
112. Id.  The Court remanded for an inquiry into obstacle preemption. Id. at
364–65.
113. See Abrams, supra note 18, at 621 (“[I]n most of the preemption cases
challenging state alienage statutes that the Supreme Court has heard, the Court
has applied an analysis that folds in the national sovereignty concerns from the
structural preemption and plenary power cases, by construing the specific alienage
regulation as regulations of immigration in disguise.”).
114. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 798 (2008).
115. Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, supra note 108, at 203; see also Lind-
say, supra note 108, at 194–96.
116. Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, supra note 108.  Concepts of be-
longing no doubt play a part in both regimes, but immigration laws define who
gets to be physically present in America; alienage laws define the extent to which
they are part of it.  Adam Cox also notes that the plenary power is not monolithic
even in the immigration context; exclusion gets less deference than removal.
Adam Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 380 &
n.20 (2004).
117. Wishnie, supra note 2, at 525.
118. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The distinction is perhaps more problematic in the context of pre-
emption of state laws that deal with the enforcement of immigration law.
In general, preemption doctrine says that although states cannot regulate
immigration at all, state regulations of alienage are subject only to a re-
quirement that the states not add burdens to a status beyond those con-
templated by Congress.119  Again, this is a case where the law already
recognizes the distinction between immigration and alienage.  As Lindsay
notes, however, state enforcement laws like the one in Arizona v. United
States120 are often explicitly designed to deter migration.121  Indeed, the
Court acknowledged as much.122  These laws aim to lend state assistance
to removing undocumented people from their territory; it is thus difficult
place them on the immigration/alienage continuum.123  And the Court
has generally not used the language of plenary power in the enforcement
context, so the applicability of these questions to law-enforcement cases
remains somewhat mysterious.
Nonetheless, the distinction between immigration and alienage laws
is clear enough at its core for us to consider the argument that the ple-
nary-power doctrine makes far less sense when we are discussing alienage
laws than immigration laws.
Bosniak points out that “some commentators have characterized fed-
eral discrimination in the allocation of Medicare benefits as a matter im-
plicating Congress’s plenary power to regulate the national borders—
despite the lack of any apparent relationship between the provision of gov-
ernment medical benefits and the admission, expulsion, and naturaliza-
tion of aliens.”124  Others, as she points out, have rejected the conflation
of immigration and alienage law.  Gerald Rosberg wrote, “The provision
restricting alien participation in the Medicare insurance program was not
in any obvious way concerned with immigration.  It did not operate as an
express condition on the right of resident aliens to enter the United States
119. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immi-
gration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); id. at 355 (“[S]tanding
alone, the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a
regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain.”); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 14 (1982) (holding that
a state’s denying “in-state” status and resulting tuition discount to G-4 aliens, solely
on account of their immigration status, “amounts to an ancillary burden not con-
templated by Congress in admitting these aliens to the United States” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
120. 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
121. Lindsay, supra note 108, at 199–200 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387 (2012)).
122. In Arizona, the Court noted that the Arizona law’s stated purpose was to
“discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic
activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Id. (quoting note fol-
lowing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (West 2012)).
123. See Lindsay, supra note 108, at 199–201.
124. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (1994).
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or to make this country their home.”125  This matters, Rosberg wrote, be-
cause the reasons for deference do not apply: “The restrictions are simply
not a part of the congressional judgment about the classes of aliens that
should be admitted to the United States.”126  Expanding on this idea, Alex
Aleinikoff criticizes the idea “that every federal regulation based on alien-
age is necessarily sustainable as an exercise of the immigration power.”127
He explains that “some statutes burdening aliens are based on considera-
tions other than a policy judgment regarding the number and classes of
aliens who may enter or remain in the United States.”128
There is no reason to accept that all regulations of alienage have im-
plications for foreign affairs.129  Lindsay argues that the Court’s jurispru-
dence has inappropriately assumed that all regulations of immigration or
alienage are justified by the federal government’s interest in maintaining
control over the nation’s foreign affairs.130  The plenary-power analysis al-
lows the government to assert its foreign-affairs interest in general, as a
categorical matter, without tying it to the specific regulation at issue.131
But many regulations of alienage are unlikely to affect any foreign-affairs
interest.  For example, it is possible that the movement of people across
international borders will be affected by whether noncitizens with tempo-
rary visas are eligible for professional licenses: eligibility for a license
might give some noncitizens a marginal incentive to come to the United
States, and the governments of their countries of origin might well care
about that.  But would it matter to foreign governments whether the same
professional license is differentially available to United States citizens, or
whether noncitizen licensees are subject to a different probationary pe-
riod during the early years of licensure?  Not all state regulations of nonci-
tizens make noticeable ripples on the international scene.  But the
plenary-power doctrine simply assumes that all such issues affect foreign
relations, with no inquiry permitted.
All of these arguments add up to the idea that plenary-power defer-
ence should not apply to federal statutes that regulate the treatment of
noncitizens in the United States, including the public benefits they are
eligible to receive.  This is not yet a challenge to the federal statutes that
operationalize discriminatory cooperative federalism; it is, rather, a chal-
lenge to the level of scrutiny that traditionally protects such statutes.  If the
challenge is correct, and strict scrutiny does not apply, then the govern-
125. Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (1977).
126. Id. at 336.
127. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83
AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 869 (1989).
128. Id. at 869–70.
129. See Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 100 (noting
criticism of Mathews “for accepting that Congress’s alienage-based restriction on
benefits challenged in the case actually constituted an immigration regulation”).
130. Lindsay, supra note 108, at 241.
131. Id.
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ment will have to defend those statutes by offering a meaningful justifica-
tion for them.  If there is no plenary power, there is no plenary power to
share with the states.
Prevailing on this argument, of course, would require overturning
Mathews v. Diaz, or at least finding a way to creatively distinguish it into
near-oblivion.132  As unlikely as it may seem that the Supreme Court
would look favorably on such a project, there are some lines of argument
that are worth considering.
We might begin the effort to cabin plenary power by pointing out that
Supreme Court precedents already recognize that in the area of alienage
law, federal power is less than exclusive.  If a power is less than exclusive,
then perhaps it is also less than plenary.
In alienage law, but not immigration law, states are allowed to exer-
cise their police power.  The scope of federal preemption is near-absolute
when it comes to the regulation of immigration; states cannot grant or
deny visas or order people deported.  But they can grant or deny welfare
benefits to noncitizens, and generally regulate the treatment of nonci-
tizens so long as they do not unduly burden the noncitizens’ status as
such.133  The fact that federal authority is not preemptive to the same ex-
tent in the realm of alienage suggests an argument that the plenary power,
likewise, ought not to be construed as equally powerful in both realms.
In De Canas, the Court affirmed that “[p]ower to regulate immigra-
tion is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”134  Then, however, it
said, “But the Court has never held that every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-
empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.”135  The
Court suggested that only some laws affecting immigrants were the subject
of exclusive power.  “[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute
does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a deter-
mination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”136
De Canas found that Congress had not occupied the field of regula-
tion of noncitizens; thus, in the absence of a specific congressional enact-
ment or an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, the state law at issue would
not be preempted.137  The Court distinguished between immigration and
alienage regulation:
132. Wishnie, supra note 2, at 524; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82
(1976) (“The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dic-
tate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the Presi-
dent in the area of immigration and naturalization.” (footnote omitted)).
133. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1982).
134. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
135. Id. at 355.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 363.
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Indeed, there would have been no need, in cases such as Graham,
Takahashi, or Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941), even to
discuss the relevant congressional enactments in finding pre-
emption of state regulation if all state regulation of aliens was
ipso facto regulation of immigration, for the existence vel non of
federal regulation is wholly irrelevant if the Constitution of its
own force requires pre-emption of such state regulation.138
De Canas thus holds that the strong federal immigration power applies
only to the decision whether to admit someone and the terms on which
they will be permitted to stay, not questions of how the law treats nonci-
tizens during their time in the United States.  If the strong federal power
does not apply to alienage regulations, neither should strong judicial
deference.
The decision in De Canas was issued in 1976, a few months before the
decision in Mathews.139  More recent cases suggest a different way in which
the borders of plenary power may be eroding.  Some scholars saw the 2001
cases of Zavydas v. Davis140 and Nguyen v. INS,141 as a partial retreat from
the plenary-power doctrine.142 Zavydas puts limits on the detention of
noncitizens when there is no longer a realistic prospect of removing them.
In a sense, it sits at the intersection of immigration law and alienage law.
The noncitizens in question are still in the immigration system, but as
their detention becomes less and less related to immigration it merits less
deference.  The recent case of Sessions v. Morales-Santana143 points in the
same direction, applying intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based classifica-
tion in the law of citizenship.144  Again, the rules at issue related to immi-
gration, but they also implicated concerns (like gender discrimination)
that had little to do with immigration, and lesser deference was afforded.
Without doubt, the plenary power doctrine lives on.145  But anyone
who seeks to challenge discriminatory cooperative federalism should at
least consider arguing that it has less force in the context of alienage laws.
C. The Anti-Delegation Challenge
So far, we’ve looked at two challenges to federal statutes that attempt
to support state discrimination.  A third challenge could be pursued even
if courts held that Congress has the power to give states discretion (with-
138. Id. at 355.
139. De Canas issued on February 25, 1976, and Diaz issued on June 1.
140. 533 U.S. 688 (2001).
141. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
142. See Spiro, supra note 16.
143. 137 S. Ct. 1678.
144. Id. at 1698.
145. See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 152 (“In spite of some signs of a depar-
ture from the plenary power doctrine, the Court still gives significant deference to
Congress in the area of immigration law.” (footnote omitted)).
29
Ayers: Discriminatory Cooperative Federalism
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
30 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 1
out violating the uniformity requirement), and even assuming that Con-
gress’s own actions are entitled to judicial deference (under the plenary-
power theory).  This third challenge argues that although Congress itself
has power, or deserves deference, it nonetheless can’t share its power, or
its entitlement to deference, with the states.
As we know, Congress’s power over matters related to immigration is
“largely immune to judicial inquiry or interference.”146  Congress can
treat citizens and noncitizens differently without violating the right to
equal protection, provided only that the differential treatment is not
“wholly irrational.”147  In explaining why Congress enjoys this immunity
from scrutiny, the Supreme Court has analogized immigration matters to
political questions as to which Congress’s reasoning is wholly unreview-
able.148  One way in which Congress might attempt to support state dis-
crimination, then, is to try to share with the states, or delegate to them, its
broad power to discriminate.149  To understand the third challenge to the
federal role in discriminatory cooperative federalism, we’ll first have to
understand why a court might find that Congress’s power to discriminate,
or its entitlement to deference, could be delegated to the states.
1. Arguments for Delegability
Some scholars and courts have argued that under the right circum-
stances, Congress has the power to authorize, or validate, state actions that
would otherwise be unconstitutional.
The leading judicial statement that is cited in defense of this proposi-
tion is from Plyler v. Doe, in which the Court said, “if the Federal Govern-
ment has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate
standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course,
follow the federal direction.”150  This is dicta; Plyler struck down a state
146. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy
towards aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies
in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance
of a republican form of government.  Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to
the political branches of government as to be largely immune to judicial inquiry or
interference.”).
147. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83; see Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567,
582 (2d Cir. 2001).  For criticism of this doctrine, see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segrega-
tion’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, supra note 110, at
549.
148. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81–82.
149. Carrasco calls this “inverse preemption.”  Carrasco, supra note 2, at 618.
“Under such a theory, a state would be empowered to violate the Equal Protection
Clause because Congress has authorized it to do so.” Id.
150. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351 (1976)).  Carrasco tries to make this go away:
As the Court’s citation to DeCanas v. Bica suggests, however, the dictum
must be strictly limited to state regulation of undocumented aliens in
contexts in which the states have a legitimate regulatory interest.  Because
DeCanas, like Plyler, involved a classification of undocumented aliens, and
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program.  And, as discussed above, it’s unclear what the Court had in
mind when it said states can “follow the federal direction.”151  It might
merely mean that states can follow congressional “directions” in the sense
of commands.  If so, the proposition is uncontroversial, but irrelevant to
federal statutes that attempt to give states discretion.  Moreover, other ju-
dicial statements (discussed below) push strongly in the opposite
direction.152
Nonetheless, some scholars have developed the case for delegability
in significant detail.  For example, William Cohen argued in 1983 that
“Congress should be able to approve unconstitutional policy choices in
state laws when Congress is not constitutionally prohibited from directly
adopting the same policy itself.”153  Cohen didn’t think Congress could
validate all unconstitutional state laws; the power existed, he said, only
when the reason for unconstitutionality stemmed from the division of
power between Congress and the states.154  What he meant by this, appar-
ently, was simply that Congress can’t authorize anything it can’t do itself.
For example, states can’t tax transactions beyond their borders, but Con-
gress can tax transactions in any state; therefore, Cohen says, the congres-
sional power to validate applies.155  But gender discrimination, he noted,
is equally impermissible when perpetrated by Congress or the states, so
Congress cannot validate states’ gender discrimination.156
Cohen’s analysis culminated in what he called a “disturbing conclu-
sion”: “Because earlier Supreme Court cases suggest that federal power to
deny benefits to aliens has no limits, it follows that congressional power to
validate the most ‘invidious’ state alienage classifications is also limit-
less.”157  This follows necessarily from his principle that Congress can vali-
date anything it can itself do: since Congress can treat noncitizens
differently, it can authorize states to do the same.
But Cohen’s principle is far from obvious.  Some congressional pow-
ers can be delegated, but others can’t.158  Why should the power to treat
noncitizens differently be delegable?  Cohen thought that any other con-
because DeCanas was not decided on the basis of equal protection, any
reliance on this case to support the validity of state action under IRCA is
misplaced.
Carrasco, supra note 2, at 622–23.
151. See supra, paragraph following note 80.
152. See infra, Section II.C.2.a, notes 164–189 and accompanying text.
153. Cohen, supra note 2, at 388.
154. Id. at 388.
155. Id. at 401.
156. Id. at 400–01.
157. Id. at 420–21 (footnote omitted).
158. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(holding that Congress can’t delegate Article III jurisdiction to non-Article III
courts); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315
(2000) (“Reports of the death of the nondelegation doctrine have been greatly
exaggerated.”).
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clusion “could produce bizarre results.”159  “For example,” he wrote,
“Congress might be able to make an alien’s application for state welfare
benefits a basis for deportation but not be able to authorize the states to
deny aliens those benefits in the first instance.”160  He didn’t specify why
that result is bizarre.  Congress may have the power to deport someone for
doing X, but it hardly follows that Congress can itself prohibit X.  For ex-
ample, a federal statute says that noncitizens can’t receive asylum if they
have persecuted others in their country of origin.161  Thus, people who,
while abroad, persecuted others can be deported.  But that doesn’t neces-
sarily imply that Congress has the extraterritorial jurisdiction required to
prohibit persecution abroad.162  Likewise, Congress has provided that
noncitizens become deportable if they get a divorce within two years after
marrying for immigration-related reasons.163  But that hardly means that
Congress can prohibit the divorce.  The same is true of conduct by states:
the fact that Congress can deport a noncitizen for receiving something
from a state does not mean that Congress can directly prohibit the state
from giving it to the noncitizen.  Cohen’s argument isn’t necessarily
wrong; it just requires a further premise.  Some powers are transferable,
and others aren’t.  What is needed is a test that will allow us to distinguish
which are which.  The opponents of delegability have done much more
than Cohen to develop such a test.
2. Arguments Against Delegability
The arguments against the delegability of the federal power to dis-
criminate are strong.  Leading the charge against delegability in a 2001
article, Michael Wishnie argued that the federal power to discriminate
against noncitizens can’t be delegated, because the immigration power in
general is “exclusively national and incapable of devolution to the
states.”164  This is essentially the flip-side of the plenary-power doctrine: if
the federal power over immigration is so sacred that courts can’t oversee
it, then it should also be too sacred to share with the states.
The anti-delegability challenge has two basic components: an inter-
pretation of Supreme Court precedents, and an argument about the
sources of the immigration power.
159. Cohen, supra note 2, at 421.
160. Id. at 421.
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018); id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018); see
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (analyzing the scope of the persecutor
bar).
162. Congress has taken measures to discourage some kinds of persecution
abroad; see the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–292,
as amended by Public Law 106–55, Public Law 106–113, Public Law 107–228, Pub-
lic Law 108–332, and Public Law 108–458).  But the question of whether such mea-
sures are within Congress’s power are completely separate from whether Congress
has the power to directly prohibit similar conduct within the United States.
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2018).
164. Wishnie, supra note 2, at 494.
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a. Do Supreme Court Precedents Support Delegability?
Wishnie notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly described the
federal immigration power as exclusive.165  For example, in 1875, the
Court said, “The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens
and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not
to the States.”166  The Court repeated this pronouncement many times,
saying, for example, in De Canas v. Bica that “[p]ower to regulate immigra-
tion is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”167  And again in Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong: “[T]he authority to control immigration is . . . vested
solely in the Federal Government, rather than the States.”168
To be sure, the Court just as often describes the power as “preemi-
nent,”169 or describes state powers as “subordinate,”170 rather than
describing federal power as “exclusive.”  And, as Wishnie rightly notes, “Ju-
dicial declarations that the immigration power arises exclusively at the fed-
eral level, however, do not address the question whether the power may be
transferred or delegated by Congress.”171  So what evidence is there on
the transferability or delegability of the power?
In Chae Chan Pin v. United States,172 when the Supreme Court en-
dorsed a federal power to exclude noncitizens from the United States, the
Court said that the power of exclusion “cannot be granted away or re-
strained on behalf of any one.  The powers of government are delegated
in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other
165. Id. at 530–31.
166. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
167. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
81 (1976) (“[T]he responsibility for regulating the relationship between the
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches
of the Federal Government.”); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410,
416 (1948) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—
is vested solely in the Federal Government.” (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941)
(“[T]he power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is
not an equal and continually existing concurrent power of state and nation, but
that whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.”); see
also Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.)
(describing “sovereign powers over foreign relations, foreign commerce, citizen-
ship, and immigration . . . that states and cities do not possess” (citation omitted)),
aff’d sub nom, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 521 U.S. 32 (2000).
168. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he au-
thority to control immigration is . . . vested solely in the Federal Government,
rather than the States . . . .”).
169. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
170. Hines, 312 U.S. at 68 (“[T]he power to restrict, limit, regulate, and regis-
ter aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously existing concurrent
power of state and nation, but that whatever power a state may have is subordinate
to supreme national law.”).
171. Wishnie, supra note 2, at 531.
172. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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parties.  They cannot be abandoned or surrendered.”173  This is perhaps
the clearest judicial statement against delegability to the states, but it is
dicta.  Statements in Graham v. Richardson, which struck down a state law,
have been the focus of more debate.
Graham says that “Congress does not have the power to authorize the
individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”174  This might be
thought to end the inquiry.  But the defenders of delegability have come
up with what they think are ways around this language.
First, it can be argued that the statement is dicta. Graham ultimately
concluded that Congress had not authorized the state law at issue, which
means the Court never needed to decide what would happen if Congress
did in fact attempt to authorize a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.175  But this argument, as stated, is wrong; what the Court said isn’t
dicta.  The reason the Court construed the federal statute not to authorize
the state law was to avoid a serious constitutional problem.176  In other
words, Graham contains a holding that serious constitutional problems
would be posed if Congress attempted to authorize the state law at issue.
Here, however, we need to keep our arguments straight.  The consti-
tutional problem Graham avoided was not a delegation problem; it was a
uniformity problem.  In the Court’s words, “A congressional enactment
construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the
subject of citizenship requirements for federally supported welfare pro-
grams would appear to contravene [the] explicit constitutional require-
ment of uniformity.”177  The uniformity doctrine is not the same as
delegation doctrine.  So Graham does not hold that there are serious con-
stitutional problems with a federal statute that delegates the power to dis-
criminate; it says that there are serious constitutional problems with a
federal statute that non-uniformly delegates the power to discriminate.  This
tells us little about the anti-delegation challenge.
Having established that Graham does not contain a holding on the
delegation question, we come back to its comment that “Congress does
not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.”178  This comment prompts a clever argument: if Con-
gress authorizes a state’s action, then that action necessarily isn’t a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.  This is essentially what the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits held, calling the Graham statement “almost tautological.”179
173. Id. at 609.
174. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
175. Id. at 382–83.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 382.
178. Id.
179. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004); see Korab v.
Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir 2014) (quoting Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254), cert.
denied sub nom. Korab v. McManaman, 135 S. Ct. 472 (2014).
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The Tenth Circuit wrote, “The question is not whether Congress can au-
thorize such a constitutional violation.  The question is what constitutes
such a violation when Congress has (clearly) expressed its will regarding a
matter relating to aliens.”180  It seems rather uncharitable to say that Gra-
ham gave us a gnomic tautology, when we could easily read it to offer sim-
ple instructions.  But the problems with the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s
views go beyond that.
Curiously not discussed in the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s analyses is
the holding in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, perhaps the only Supreme
Court case that directly bears on delegability of the immigration power.181
The case involved a policy adopted by the U.S. Civil Service Commission
excluding noncitizens from employment.182  The Court avoided deciding
whether Congress would have violated equal protection by adopting such
a requirement.183
We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the
President had expressly imposed [a] citizenship requirement, it
would be justified by the national interest in providing an incen-
tive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as provid-
ing the President with an expendable token for treaty
negotiating purposes; but we are not willing to presume that the
Chairman of the Civil Services Commission . . . was deliberately
fostering an interest so far removed from his normal
responsibilities.184
This was true even though it was fair to assume that Congress knew of the
longstanding policy and had acquiesced in it.185
The Civil Service Commission “has no responsibility for foreign af-
fairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or condi-
tions of entry, or for naturalization policies.”186  Nor does it have any
responsibility for “the economic consequences of permitting or prohibit-
ing the participation by aliens in employment opportunities . . . .”187  The
interests the Commission was responsible for “cannot provide an accept-
able rationalization for such a determination by the [Civil Service
Commission].”188
The Court didn’t use the language of anti-delegation; in one place it
referred to the question as whether the Commission’s responsibilities
180. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254.
181. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 99 (1976).
182. Id. at 90.
183. Id. at 103.
184. Id. at 105.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 114.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 116.
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could provide “a rational basis” for the rule.189  But the case functionally
bars Congress from delegating to the Commission. Hampton is powerful
evidence against the delegability of the power over immigration to the
states: if the power can’t be delegated to a federal agency, then why should
it be delegable to a separate sovereign?
b. Sources of the Immigration Power
Another way to challenge delegability is to go to the roots of the fed-
eral power.  Wishnie reviews each of the constitutional sources of power
that have been thought to support Congress’s power over immigration,
and offers convincing arguments that the powers they support are not del-
egable to the states: not the naturalization power;190 not the foreign-affairs
power conferred on the President and Congress (despite a limited, condi-
tional role allowed to the states);191 not the foreign-commerce power
(again, despite the fact that in some situations states may be allowed to tax
or burden foreign commerce).192
Wishnie notes that the Supreme Court has often said that the immi-
gration power additionally stems from an extraconstitutional source: the
proposition, which the Court saw as self-evident, that power over immigra-
tion is “an incident of sovereignty.”193  As the Court explained later, “The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never
been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal gov-
ernment as necessary concomitants of nationality.”194  Wishnie argues that
189. Id. at 115.
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817) (Marshall, J.) (“That the power of naturalization is exclu-
sively in congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be, contro-
verted . . . .”); see Wishnie, supra note 2, at 533–38 (reviewing further historical
evidence).
191. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“Power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclu-
sively.”).  For a more detailed discussion, see Wishnie, supra note 2, at 538–44.  The
Constitution does give states the power to engage in certain foreign-affairs-related
activity, including compacts with other nations, provided Congress consents. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually in-
vaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; see Wishnie, supra note 2, at 544–49.
193. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707–08 (1893) (citing scholars of interna-
tional law); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an
accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions . . . .”).
194. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
“The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
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“if the power to regulate immigration truly derives from some fundamen-
tal attribute of sovereignty, relinquishment of that power must be tanta-
mount to relinquishment of sovereignty.”195  The reader’s willingness to
accept this argument, presumably, will depend on their intuitions; as
Wishnie acknowledges, “It is not possible, of course, to point to definitive
text, history, or precedent denying Congress’s power to devolve powers
inherent in national sovereignty . . . .”196
Notably, Jennifer Gordon has argued that the federal power over im-
migration is rooted not only in the sources above, but also in the federal
power over interstate commerce.197  This, she notes, “grounds that author-
ity even more firmly in an arena without any carve-outs from constitutional
oversight.”198  While this may not directly affect the delegability argument,
it would further support an argument against congressional support for
state discrimination.
In sum, there are strong arguments against delegability, grounded
both in Supreme Court precedent and in the constitutional sources of the
immigration power.  But is the question of delegability one that needs to
be asked?
3. How to Dodge the Question of Delegability
Courts that have upheld state discrimination under the Welfare Re-
form Act have often found it possible to evade the question of delegation
entirely.199  For example, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Korab v. Fink,200
read carefully, considers only two arguments: that the Welfare Reform Act
violates the uniformity requirement, and that Hawaii violated equal pro-
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs.” Id. at 315–16.
195. Wishnie, supra note 2, at 552 (citing Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609).
196. Id.
197. Jennifer Gordon, Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immi-
gration Power and the Constitution, 93 IND. L.J. 653, 671 (2018).
198. Id. at 702.
199. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 584–85 (9th Cir. 2014); Soskin v. Reinert-
son, 353 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Colo-
rado’s PRWORA-based alien eligibility restrictions); Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16
A.3d 635, 643–44 (Conn. 2011) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Connecticut’s
PRWORA-based alien eligibility restrictions); Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 12 N.Y.3d 478,
480 (2009).
[I]n the years since Wishnie’s article, the courts that have sanctioned
state denials of welfare benefits to immigrants under rational basis scru-
tiny have not considered the states to be exercising a delegated immigra-
tion power.  Rather, PRWORA has served a different legitimizing
function . . . courts have viewed federal policy much in the way they
would in a preemption case: so long as Congress does not object to the
states’ alienage-based denials of benefits, such measures are deemed valid
and complementary to congressional policy.
Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 108.
200. 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014).
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tection by failing to provide benefits. Korab rejected both arguments, find-
ing both the federal statute and the state action constitutional.201
The Ninth Circuit thought that if a state “is following the federal di-
rection,” then the relevant level of equal-protection scrutiny is rational ba-
sis.202  In other words, federal support somehow lowers the level of equal-
protection scrutiny that applies to state actions.  The dissent thought this
confused the Supremacy Clause with equal-protection analysis.203  But the
majority insisted, somewhat icily, “We are not confused.”204
How could the state action survive equal-protection scrutiny without a
congressional delegation of power?  Wishnie thought that no other justifi-
cation for the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion could make sense.205  He recog-
nizes that the Welfare Reform Act does not explicitly delegate power to
the states, but argues that given current principles of equal protection and
immigration law, “[T]he only possible defense of post-[Welfare Reform
Act] state alienage classifications will be that Congress has delegated its
power to regulate immigration.”206
It is conceivable, however, that a statute like the Welfare Reform Act
could make it possible for a state’s actions to withstand equal-protection
scrutiny even in the absence of a delegation of congressional authority.
How would this work?  Consider analogous contexts in which state anti-
immigrant actions receive rational-basis scrutiny.  When states bar nonci-
201. Id. at 584.
202. Id. at 583 n.9.
203. Id. at at 602–03 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 583 n.9.  To be sure, the Ninth Circuit’s language sometimes seems
to suggest delegation: “Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration and
the conditions on which aliens remain in the United States, and Congress has au-
thorized states to do exactly what Hawai’i has done here . . . .” Id. at 574.
205. Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 109.
Wishnie acknowledged that the devolution that is the focus of his argu-
ment was “not explicit” in PRWORA but “should be presumed because,
under any other construction of the Welfare Act, the current rash of anti-
immigrant state welfare rules are obviously invalid under Graham’s settled
rule that state welfare discrimination against legal immigrants is unconsti-
tutional.”  But that framing fails to account for how federalism principles
more broadly, even without delegation, could similarly and illegitimately
undermine Graham.  That is, delegation is not the only means by which
courts might affect a rollback of Graham.  Whereas Wishnie’s article took
aim at the reasons why delegation could not insulate states from the re-
quirements of equal protection (given his argument that the federal gov-
ernment cannot devolve the immigration power to the states), this Article
argues Congress cannot through its own policy choices sanction state dis-
crimination against immigrants.
Id. (footnote omitted).
206. Wishnie, supra note 2, at 528.  He also thought it necessary to interpret
the Welfare Reform Act as attempting a delegation, even though the act nowhere
explicitly uses the language of delegation: “Although this devolution is not explicit,
I argue that it should be presumed because, under any other construction of the
Welfare Act, the current rash of anti-immigrant state welfare rules are obviously
invalid under Graham’s settled rule that state welfare discrimination against legal
immigrants is unconstitutional.” Id. at 496.
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/1
2020] DISCRIMINATORY COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 39
tizens from positions in their government, the usual strict scrutiny is re-
laxed, and rational-basis scrutiny applies.207  This is not because the
federal government has delegated any power to the states, but because a
fact about the situation (in this case, the fact of state sovereignty) makes
the state’s action easier to justify.208  It might similarly be the case that the
fact of congressional approval makes the state’s action easier to justify,
without any transfer of power from Congress to the state.
Even if Congress can’t delegate any particular power, courts might
decide to lower scrutiny in light of consistency with federal policy.209  On this
view, there is no delegation issue to resolve.  We merely lower scrutiny in
light of the background fact that Congress is happy.  That fact, like facts
about the class targeted (in the case of undocumented people) or facts
about the nature of the state interest (in the political-function cases), can
result in lowered scrutiny.
If the question is whether we should construe the Welfare Reform Act
as attempting a delegation of power, as opposed to some other method of
supporting discrimination, advocates may not need to answer it.  On the
contrary, it may be necessary to rebut every possible theory on which the
Welfare Reform Act could be upheld.  Courts have thus far upheld the
Welfare Reform Act on the theory that congressional approval is a reason
to lower scrutiny, rather than a delegation, but that could change.  Advo-
cates should thus remain ready to rebut the claim that Congress can dele-
gate its powers.210
And then they’ll have to address the question of equal protection
itself.
III. CHALLENGING STATES’ ROLE IN DISCRIMINATORY
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
The challenges discussed above are all aimed at the federal statutes
that make discriminatory cooperative federalism possible.  It is important
to distinguish between challenges to those federal statutes and challenges
to the action states take as part of discriminatory cooperative-federalism
207. The doctrine that state governments can exclude noncitizens from cer-
tain kinds of government employment (typically employment that involves some
degree of policy-making) is expressed in cases like Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S.
432, 436, 439 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979); Foley v. Conne-
lie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
208. See Cabell, 454 U.S. at 439.
209. See Condon, supra note 2, at 147–48.
210. See Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 108.
[W]hen courts accept that Congress has created a uniform immigration
rule for states to follow, they are really concluding that Congress has set
immigration policy, which the Supremacy Clause requires states to follow;
they are not ruling that Congress has shared (or devolved) immigration
rulemaking power so that the states may set their own immigration law.
Id.
39
Ayers: Discriminatory Cooperative Federalism
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
40 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 1
programs.211  Noncitizens who have been subjected to discrimination
under a cooperative-federalism scheme should know that they have the
right to challenge either element in such a scheme: the federal statute that
authorizes or encourages discriminatory state action, and the state laws
that are passed under the federal scheme.
State laws that form part of a discriminatory-cooperative-federalism
scheme can often be challenged on multiple grounds.  There may be vari-
ous theories available under state constitutions; for example, in New York,
a denial of benefits under the Welfare Reform Act was successfully chal-
lenged under a state constitution provision that guarantees adequate aid
and care to the needy.212  But the most common kind of challenge that
has been brought so far, and the one that has divided courts nationwide, is
a challenge under the federal Equal Protection Clause.
An equal-protection claim has two basic components: differential
treatment, and a lack of justification.  In other words, plaintiffs asserting a
denial of equal protection must say first that they are being treated differ-
ently than someone similarly situated and second that there is no ade-
quate justification for that differential treatment.213  When a state treats
citizens and noncitizens differently, federal approval functions as a poten-
tial justification for the differential treatment.  The issue is whether it can
be a successful justification.
This framework is very different from the delegation framework dis-
cussed above, in which federal authorization confers power on the state.  In
the equal-protection framework, the federal scheme gives states justifica-
tion, not power.  Thus, the question in equal-protection analysis is not
whether the federal government has given states authority, but whether it
has given them a sufficient reason for the differential treatment.
Courts have differed sharply on how the Equal Protection Clause ap-
plies to discriminatory cooperative federalism in part because they have
sharply different views about which factors should count as part of the
analysis.  In particular, courts disagree about whether to consider, as part
of equal-protection analysis, concerns about uniformity of federal statutes
and delegability of federal powers.  As discussed above, uniformity and
delegability are concerns about the federal statutes that make discrimina-
211. Cf. id. at 108–10 (noting that delegation and uniform-rule analyses can-
not answer important questions about the level of equal-protection scrutiny that
applies to state discrimination against noncitizens).
212. Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 427–28 (2001). Finch was based on the
state equal protection clause. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 459
Mass. 655, 668 (2011).
213. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)));
id. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In every equal protection case, we have to ask
certain basic questions” including “[w]hat is the public purpose that is being
served by the law?  What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justi-
fies the disparate treatment?”).
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/1
2020] DISCRIMINATORY COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 41
tory cooperative federalism possible.  Once this is understood, we can sim-
plify the equal-protection analysis significantly: delegability and uniformity
are reasons to challenge federal statutes, and they can therefore be kept
separate from equal-protection analysis.
But the core conceptual question of whether federal approval
changes the equal-protection analysis will not be so easy to eliminate.  An-
other way to frame this question is to say that we need to understand what
level of equal-protection scrutiny applies to actions that states take as part
of discriminatory-cooperative-federalism schemes.  As Section III.A will ex-
plain, courts have divided on this question.
Section III.B will propose that to decide what level of scrutiny applies,
we will have to understand the reasons courts have applied strict scrutiny
in other immigration-related contexts, so that we can then decide whether
those reasons apply here.  I argue that courts have applied strict scrutiny
to specific groups for at least two reasons: to prevent states from taking
account of morally irrelevant factors, and to prevent the subordination of
specific groups.  Both of those reasons apply forcefully in the immigration
context.
Section III.C takes this understanding of strict scrutiny and applies it
to discriminatory cooperative federalism.  If the goal of strict scrutiny is to
prevent states from taking account of morally irrelevant factors, and to
prevent the subordination of noncitizens, then strict scrutiny should apply
to the actions states take as part of discriminatory cooperative-federalism
schemes.  Strict scrutiny should apply whenever states have a choice.
Section III.D explains that it can be tricky to determine when states
have a meaningful choice.  As explained in Part I, above, some federal
statutes give states no choice at all, while others give states a conditional
choice, or otherwise put states under significant constraints.  I’ll propose a
solution to this problem: whenever states have a meaningful choice, strict
scrutiny should apply.
A. What Level of Scrutiny Should Apply to Discriminatory
Cooperative Federalism?
Courts have long been perplexed by whether congressional approval
can justify state discrimination against noncitizens.214  Some courts have
held that when Congress approves the discrimination, the appropriate
level of judicial scrutiny is rational-basis scrutiny.  The Tenth Circuit in
Soskin held that rational-basis review applies when state law “effectuate[s]
national policy.”215  Even though courts are reviewing state laws, they are
214. For example, the majority and dissent in Korab, arguing about whether
Congress’s intent was relevant to the equal-protection question, accused each
other of being confused about whether the issue presented was equal protection or
preemption. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
215. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004).
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in effect reviewing congressional policy, and should therefore defer to that
federal policy.216
The Ninth Circuit in Korab reasoned similarly, describing a nonci-
tizen’s challenge to congressionally approved state discrimination as “a
backdoor challenge to the federal classifications.”217  The implication is
that plaintiffs cannot challenge the state action without also invalidating
the federal statute, but the court did not explain why this is true.  Just as a
state could be barred from taking part in a cooperative-federalism scheme
by a state constitutional prohibition,218 an injunction against a state’s ac-
tion based on the Equal Protection Clause would not necessarily run
against the federal statute.
Rational-basis scrutiny applied, the court said, “because Hawai’i is
merely following the federal direction set forth by Congress under the
Welfare Reform Act.”219  But the court made little effort to explain the
mechanism by which congressional approval lowered equal-protection
scrutiny.
Other courts have held that Congress’s approval doesn’t matter: in
essence, whenever a state has control over its treatment of noncitizens, the
usual strict scrutiny applies.220  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
applied strict scrutiny to the exclusion of certain noncitizens from a pro-
gram (part of what is now sometimes called “Romney Care”) that helped
pay the costs of beneficiaries’ health insurance.221  The Welfare Reform
Act gave the state discretion to effect just such a denial, but this did not
216. Id.
217. Korab, 797 F.3d at 579; cf. HOWLIN’ WOLF, BACK DOOR MAN (Weton-Wes-
gram 1961) (“When everybody trying to sleep, I’m somewhere making my mid-
night creep / Every morning the rooster crow, something tell me I got to go / I am
a back door man.”).
The court in Korab also viewed the plaintiffs as asking the state to replace
federal funds the federal government had chosen to withdraw.  Granting this re-
lief, the court said, would compel the state “to provide wholly state-funded benefits
equal to Medicaid to [the relevant noncitizens], thus effectively rendering mean-
ingless the discretion Congress gave to the states in 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a).” Korab, 797
F.3d at 582 (citing Sudomir v. McMahon 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985)).
218. See Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 427–28 (2001).
219. Korab, 797 F.3d at 584.  Curiously, Korab never identifies the rational ba-
sis for the state’s action.
220. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1461 (“State public-benefit schemes that
deny joint-funded benefits to aliens for whom federal law permits eligibility are
unconstitutional because they effect alienage classifications as a matter of state
discretion.”).
221. The program at issue in Finch was a state program called Commonwealth
Care that received federal funds to partially reimburse the state for benefits given
to citizens and some noncitizens; noncitizens who were ineligible for comparable
federal benefits could get benefits from the program, but the state received no
reimbursement for them. Finch, 459 Mass. at 659.  The state then passed a statute
making federally ineligible noncitizens ineligible for Commonwealth Care, but si-
multaneously creating a new state program (Commonwealth Bridge) for which
those noncitizens were eligible. Id. at 660.
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change the court’s mind about the level of scrutiny.222  The key factor was
that Congress had given the state discretion, rather than imposing a man-
date: “Where the State is left with a range of options including discrimina-
tory and nondiscriminatory policies, its selection amongst those options
must be reviewed under the standards applicable to the State and not
those applicable to Congress.”223
The Maryland Supreme Court likewise applied strict scrutiny to a de-
nial of state benefits to noncitizens, even though that denial was author-
ized by the Welfare Reform Act.224  But the Maryland court blurred
multiple analyses together.  It rejected the state’s argument, which was
that rational basis should apply because the Welfare Reform Act “pre-
222. Id. at 673.
223. Id. at 674.  The federal government will be subsidizing the state’s provi-
sion of benefits to some residents (citizens and eligible aliens) but not to others
(federally ineligible aliens).  “This is a financial impediment to State action but not
a mandate under the supremacy clause that might require the application of ra-
tional basis review.” Id.
Finch distinguished an earlier case, Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional Assis-
tance, 437 Mass. 521, 522 (2002), by suggesting that Doe involved a federal mandate,
rather than a federal statute that gave discretion to the states: “In reaching our
conclusion in Doe, however, we did not bridge the analytical gap between congres-
sional action ‘dictating how States are to regulate and legislate issues relating to
aliens’ and the State’s responsibilities where Congress enacts a noncompulsory
rule and the Commonwealth voluntarily ‘adopt[s] those national policies and
guidelines.’” Finch, 459 Mass. at 671.  That was a partial truth.
Doe involved a state program, Temporary Assistance for Families with Depen-
dent Children, which was funded partly by the federal Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program.  In other words, it was jointly funded. Id. The Welfare
Reform Act barred “qualified aliens” from receiving benefits through this program
until they’d been residents for five years.  8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2018).  Massachu-
setts amended its law to conform to this requirement, and the Doe court upheld
that amendment. Doe, 437 Mass. at 526–27 (“[I]t would make no sense to say that
Congress has plenary power to legislate national immigration policies and guide-
lines subject to a deferential (rational basis) standard of review, and then to hold
that the equal protection clause of the Constitution restrains States from adhering
to or adopting those national policies and guidelines because their actions are
subject to a higher (strict scrutiny) standard of review.”).
But Doe also involved as second provision of the same state law, which created
a supplemental program, exclusively for noncitizens, and then imposed different
residency requirements on those noncitizens depending on their immigration sta-
tus. Id. at 528.  The court found that this provision distinguishes on the basis of
residency, not alienage, and therefore applied rational-basis scrutiny. Id.  at
533–34.  Since only noncitizens were subject to the residency requirement, this
reasoning is questionable at best.
224. Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 711 (2006).  The program in Ehrlich was a
state-funded program created to give medical assistance to noncitizens who had
been excluded from Medicaid by the Welfare Reform Act. Id. at 703.  But the state
government then eliminated funding for the program. Id. at 704–05. Ehlich ap-
plied both the state and federal equal-protection clauses. Id. at 716 (“[E]ven
though Appellees ground their equal-protection challenge solely on Article 24 [of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights], we shall consider the argument in light of
both cases interpreting and applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”).
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scribed a uniform rule for the treatment of an alien sub-class in regard to
the provision of medical benefits, which Maryland could follow.”225  The
argument it considered, in other words, was “whether the State action
here is shielded by the ‘uniform rule’ theory from what otherwise should
be a strict scrutiny standard of review.”226  As I argued above, this is a
misunderstanding of the uniformity issue, which relates to the validity of
the federal law, not the state action taken under it.  It is perfectly conceiva-
ble that the level of scrutiny could be reduced on the ground that the state
is implementing federal policy even if the federal law does not create a
uniform rule.  The government’s confused theory of the case didn’t create
any problematic precedent, however, because the Maryland court rejected
the theory.  In doing so, it held both that the relevant federal power was
nondelegable227 and that the Welfare Reform Act creates no uniform
rule.228  It did not separately discuss whether rational-basis scrutiny should
apply because of the mere fact that Congress apparently approved of the
state action.
In short, while some courts have held that federal approval lowers the
level of equal-protection scrutiny, others have held that it does not.  To
decide who is right, and whether federal approval should affect the level
of equal-protection scrutiny, it will be necessary to attain a more precise
understanding of how courts determine when strict scrutiny applies and
when it doesn’t.  Unfortunately, this is not a question that has a clear
answer.
B. Well, What Level of Scrutiny Should Apply Anywhere?
To understand whether strict scrutiny should apply to state discrimi-
nation that the federal government supports, it will be necessary to resolve
a longstanding controversy over the equal-protection rights of noncitizens.
225. Id. at 709.
226. Id. at 722.
227. Id. at 725 (2006) (“It is not disputed that the federal government may
authorize States to legislate concurrently in subject areas in which it has acted; yet,
it is less evident to this Court that the federal government expressly may transfer its
authority (and thus justify a relaxed level of scrutiny of the resultant State action)
to the States in order to regulate in the area of immigration in a manner that
would be permissible if done by the federal government, but unconstitutional if
carried out independently by an individual State.” (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971))).
228. Id. at 725–26 (“Assuming that the power over immigration and naturali-
zation possessed by the federal government includes establishing a single, uniform,
and articulated directive for treating aliens regarding State-only funded medical
assistance benefits, such that we will employ a rational basis standard of review to a
State’s elimination of State-only funded benefits for certain resident aliens, we con-
clude that PRWORA prescribes no uniform rule in any event.  Rather, Congress
has provided discretion to the States with regard to their decisions whether to
provide State-funded medical benefits, on the basis of alienage, to those resident
aliens who do not meet the requirements for federal medical assistance.  The grant
of discretion, without more, is not a uniform rule for purposes of imposing only a
rational basis test.”  (footnote omitted)).
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Some scholars, and at least one judge, have argued against the very idea of
strict scrutiny for noncitizens.  They accept that states shouldn’t generally
regulate immigration.  But they think that the reason for barring state reg-
ulation of immigration is preemption, not equal protection.229  Nonci-
tizens don’t really have rights under the Equal Protection Clause, they
think; it’s the federal government that has the right to exclusive control
over immigration issues.  So it’s true that states can’t generally discrimi-
nate against noncitizens, but only because state discrimination encroaches
on the federal government’s exclusive domain.
If this argument is correct, then discriminatory cooperative federal-
ism poses no equal-protection problem at all.  If the only reason to restrict
state regulation of immigration is to protect federal power, then federal
support disposes of all possible problems.  If, on the other hand, there are
other reasons to restrict state regulation of immigration, then courts
might have to restrict state regulation of immigration even in cases of fed-
eral support.  So the debate over discriminatory cooperative federalism
forces courts to take a position in this longstanding debate.
This Section of the Article first explains why some have argued that
equal-protection scrutiny, in the immigration context, exists only to pro-
tect federal power.  It then explains why there are in fact other reasons for
equal-protection scrutiny.  This sets up the following section, which ap-
plies those other reasons to the case of discriminatory cooperative
federalism.
1. Is Federal Power the Reason States Can’t Discriminate Against Noncitizens?
In the immigration context, there has always been a close relationship
between equal protection and federal power.  Early Supreme Court cases
that struck down state anti-immigrant laws using equal protection230
tended to discuss federal power in the course of their equal-protection
analysis.231  In those cases, federal power has played an important role in
the equal-protection analysis.232
In Graham, for example, Congress had made clear “that as long as
[noncitizens] are here they are entitled to the full and equal benefit of all
state laws for the security of persons and property.”233  But the challenged
state laws imposed “auxiliary burdens upon the entrance or residence of
aliens who suffer the distress, after entry, of economic dependency on
229. This argument is based partly on the way cases like Graham sometimes
seem to blur equal protection and federal power. See infra notes 231–235.
230. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
231. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)
(“State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence
of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived
federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.”).
232. See Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 111.
233. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971).
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public assistance.”234  The state laws thus “equate with the assertion of a
right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance and abode.  Since
such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power, they are constitutionally
impermissible.”235
Early commentators noted that Graham’s equal-protection holding
was thus unnecessary.  It could have stopped with the finding that federal
law preempted the state laws.  Indeed, it should have done so, given the
general principle that courts should, when possible, avoid striking down
laws in a way that Congress can’t undo.236
And that’s just what more recent Supreme Court cases have done:
used a preemption framework, without discussing equal protection, to ad-
dress the lawfulness of state laws that adversely affect noncitizens.237
Wherever there is an issue about noncitizens and equal protection, there
is also a preemption issue, because any state discrimination against nonci-
tizens also must be analyzed to see if the state law infringes on federal
power.  (Discriminatory cooperative federalism is a case where the state
law plainly does not contravene federal policy, which is why it may be the
key to these debates.)  For example, in Toll v. Moreno, the Court struck
down a Maryland rule that denied in-state tuition to certain noncitizens
(specifically, those on G-4 diplomatic visas).238  The district court had con-
cluded that the rule violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the Su-
preme Court struck it down on the basis of preemption.239
The question, then, is whether there is a need for the two overlapping
doctrines of preemption and equal protection.  When states discriminate
against noncitizens, is there a need for two vectors along which the state
law might be challenged?  Some scholars, and at least one judge, have
argued that in this context, the courts’ equal-protection analysis is really
just another form of preemption analysis, and that we would be better off
dispensing with the language of equal protection altogether.
In 2014, Judge Jay Bybee on the Ninth Circuit wrote a concurrence
arguing that cases involving state discrimination against noncitizens
should no longer be analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause; instead,
they should be analyzed only as preemption cases.240  It is important not
to mistake one concurrence for a movement, and Judge Bybee is in some
respects a marginal figure.  At the very least, he has been a controversial
one since the revelation that during his service in the Office of Legal
234. Id. at 378–79.
235. Id. at 380.
236. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Ply-
ler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 187–88 (1982).
237. Cases that use the Supremacy Clause rather than an equal-protection
framework include Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1982), and Chamber of Commerce
of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011).
238. Toll, 458 U.S. at 9–10.
239. Id.
240. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 598 (2014) (Bybee, J., concurring).
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Counsel he signed memos justifying the Bush Administration’s use of
waterboarding and other forms of torture.241  But he is not alone in argu-
ing against the application of equal-protection doctrine to noncitizens; his
arguments mirror a long-present current in equal-protection thinking.
For the last fifty years, articles by a series of scholars have urged the Su-
preme Court to replace equal-protection scrutiny of state laws affecting
noncitizens with preemption analysis.242
The difference in doctrines matters.  If equal-protection challenges
are a real, independent basis for challenging state discrimination against
noncitizens, then federal permission doesn’t change things.243  If, on the
other hand, equal-protection challenges to state discrimination against
noncitizens are based on a lack of federal authority, then federal authori-
zation solves the problem and there can be no equal-protection challenge.
If we abolish equal-protection scrutiny for laws that treat noncitizens dif-
ferently, then discriminatory cooperative federalism is unambiguously
permissible.
Commentators have offered both a descriptive and a normative argu-
ment for the preemption-only view.  The descriptive argument is a claim
that preemption better explains the case law in this area.  The normative
argument is that there is nothing wrong with states’ taking immigration
status into account in their policymaking; unlike race, for example, immi-
gration status is a morally relevant factor that states can properly base pol-
icy on.  Neither is convincing.  The following two sections will consider
them in turn.
2. Does the Case Law Make More Sense Without Equal Protection?
The first argument against continuing to apply equal-protection scru-
tiny is that an approach based on preemption alone would be concep-
tually neater, in that it would better explain existing case law.  Bybee writes
that the Graham doctrine is “riddled with exceptions and caveats that make
consistent judicial review of alienage classifications difficult.”244  But By-
241. See Karl Vick, Friends Say Judge Bybee Regrets Interrogation Memo He Signed,
WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/04/24/AR2009042403888.html [https://perma.cc/56FE-AE8X]; see
also OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY’S USE OF ‘ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES’ ON SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS 159, 259 (2009) (finding Bybee’s conclusions to represent miscon-
duct); Memorandum from David Margolis, Op. Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. 67–69
(2010), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-margolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RQ6L-GN6Y] (finding Bybee’s conclusions to represent mere “bad judgment”).
242. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 65 (1969); David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption
or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1979); Note, State Burdens on Resi-
dent Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L.J. 940, 941–42 (1980).
243. See Marisa Ann Tostado, Alienation: Congressional Authorization of State Dis-
crimination Against Immigrants, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1052 (1998).
244. Korab, 797 F.3d at 585.
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bee never attempts to show that the exceptions are confusing, only that
they exist.245  As Condon notes, doctrines that have exceptions are not
necessarily incoherent.246  If we are going to abolish all doctrines that
have more than two exceptions, there is a long, dark night ahead of us.
The hearsay rule, which has at least twenty-nine exceptions (to say nothing
of its “exclusions”), will have to go to the gallows long before Graham gets
there.247
Bybee also argues that the alienage-strict-scrutiny cases are in tension
with the general principle that equal-protection doctrine applies equally
to Congress and the states; it is very unusual to apply different scrutiny to
Congress and the states.248  True, but this cuts both ways.  While Bybee
takes it to mean we should abandon the idea of applying strict scrutiny to
the states, the tension could just as easily be assuaged by applying strict
scrutiny to Congress’s discrimination against noncitizens.  (If this idea
seems unthinkable, because the application of strict scrutiny would effec-
tively erase immigration law, remember that we are discussing alienage
cases, not cases involving admission and deportation; it seems unlikely that
foreign powers would be aggravated if Congress were required to treat
noncitizens and citizens alike in the distribution of benefits.)  Anyone who
wants the Equal Protection Clause to treat states and Congress alike has to
explain why both should get a free pass, rather than neither.
Preemption, according to some writers, does a better job explaining
both why states are not generally allowed to discriminate against nonci-
tizens and why specific exceptions to this principle exist.249  Consider, for
245. Bybee writes,
In the years since Graham was decided, the Supreme Court has applied
different levels of scrutiny depending on whether the state or the federal
government established the challenged restriction, whether the restric-
tion involved economic rights or the democratic process of self-govern-
ment (often stretching that concept), whether the restriction involved
undocumented aliens, and whether the discriminatory classification was
created by Congress or an administrative agency.
Id.  None of these exceptions seem particularly difficult to apply, with the possible
exception of the second one (cases involving the democratic process of self-gov-
ernment), which was not at issue in Korab.
246. Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 105.  Condon
writes, “This is an odd argument given that exceptions, in fact, can bring coher-
ence to a rule that does not apply in every case.” Id.
247. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing twenty-three exceptions to the hearsay rule);
FED. R. EVID. 805 (five more exceptions); FED. R. EVID. 807 (another exception); see
also FED. R. EVID. 801 (“exclusions” from hearsay).
248. Korab, 797 F.3d at 587–91 (Bybee, Circuit J., concurring); see Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
249. Jesse Choper, for example, argued that preemption would serve better
than equal protection to explain why states cannot discriminate against nonci-
tizens. Comments of Jesse Choper, in JESSE H. CHOPER, YALE KAMISAR, & LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS: 1981–1982: AN EDITED
TRANSCRIPT OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW SYMPOSIUM 16–17 (ed. Dorothy Opperman 1983).  Choper was uncomfortable
with the idea that equal-protection doctrine could allow federal discrimination
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example, the exception to strict scrutiny for discrimination against un-
documented people.250  When a person is lawfully present, it is fair to as-
sume that Congress does not want states to discriminate against them,
because discrimination makes their residence in the state more difficult
than Congress intended.251  But only when they are lawfully present.  If
preemption is the real reason why states can’t discriminate against nonci-
tizens, then it makes sense that undocumented people would be ex-
empted,252 because the federal government has not made clear any
intention for states to allow them residence.253
Similarly, preemption arguably explains the political-function excep-
tion to strict scrutiny (the doctrine under which states are not subject to
strict scrutiny when they exclude noncitizens from employment in govern-
ment jobs whose officeholders exercise the political power of the commu-
nity).254  Equal protection does not deny states the right to exclude
noncitizens from the political process, because Congress excludes them
from the federal political process and thus presumably does not mind
states doing the same.255
Notably, preemption would not explain why some circuits have ap-
plied rational-basis scrutiny to laws that discriminate against people with
temporary visas.256  Congress presumably no more wanted states to bur-
against noncitizens, but not state discrimination. Id.  It would be conceptually
much neater, he thought, to say that Congress’s exclusive power over immigration
preempts state distinctions between citizens and noncitizens. Id.  Choper makes
the same argument about Plyler v. Doe; he thinks that the Court could have held
that the statute denying undocumented children an education violated the
Supremacy Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 29–30.
250. See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing
exception to strict scrutiny for state laws that discriminate against the undocu-
mented).  Full disclosure: I argued Dandamudi on behalf of the state.
251. Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Ap-
praisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1063–64 (1979).
252. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 74 (discussing exception to strict scrutiny for
state laws that discriminate against the undocumented).
253. Of course, this argument (that preemption does not provide a reason for
strict scrutiny protection of the undocumented) could just as easily be a reason to
criticize the courts’ refusal to apply strict scrutiny to the undocumented. See Con-
don, Equal Protection Exceptionalism, supra note 28, at 567–68; see also Levi, supra
note 242, at 1080 (“Certainly if resident aliens are ‘discrete’ and ‘insular,’ isolated
by language and culture, then illegal and nonimmigrant aliens are even more vul-
nerable.” (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971))).
254. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436–39 (1982); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296–97
(1978).
255. See Levi, supra note 242, at 1079.
256. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533
(6th Cir. 2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2005), hearing en banc
denied, 444 F.3d 428 (2006).  Justice Rehnquist also sought such an exception to
strict scrutiny. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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den those noncitizens than to burden lawful permanent residents.  But
perhaps (as the Second Circuit thinks) those courts are simply wrong.257
All of these arguments about the exceptions to strict scrutiny are vul-
nerable to three persuasive counterarguments.  First, if indeed these ex-
ceptions represent a troubling inconsistency in equal-protection doctrine,
then it might just as well be the exceptions, rather than the doctrine itself,
that should be abandoned.  Second, conceptual simplicity is hardly a rea-
son to abandon constitutional protection for a threatened group.258  And,
third, the Supreme Court has offered its own reasons for the exceptions,
and there is no reason to believe it was hiding a preemption card up its
sleeve when it did so.259  To those reasons, and the normative case for
strict scrutiny, the next section turns.
3. Is Immigration Status Morally Relevant?
The normative argument for dispensing with strict scrutiny of state
laws affecting noncitizens is that immigration status matters.  In other
words, states have legitimate reasons for taking account of immigration
status when they make policy.  Citizens and noncitizens are not similarly
situated, and so there is no objection to treating them differently.
The purpose of equal-protection doctrine, according to one theory, is
to ensure that the government treats similarly situated groups similarly.
On this view, the Equal Protection Clause “keeps governmental decision
makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects
alike.”260  Adopting this approach, Perry writes that the purpose of equal-
protection doctrine is to prevent governments from taking account of sta-
tuses that are not morally (i.e., properly or legitimately) relevant to policy-
makers’ decisions.261  If the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ensure that
state governments never take morally irrelevant matters into consideration
in their policymaking, the question is whether it is ever legitimate for im-
migration status to play a role in policy.
257. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 74–75.
258. Then again, as Condon observes, if courts had all along been applying a
form of preemption analysis and mistakenly calling it equal protection, it would be
better to start being candid about it.  Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra
note 2, at 105.
259. As for the level of scrutiny for state laws that discriminate against the
undocumented, the Court said that “Persuasive arguments support the view that a
State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the
United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct.”  Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 219 (1982).  As for the political function cases, the Court said, “We recog-
nize a State’s interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting
participation in that government to those who are within ‘the basic conception of
a political community.’”  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (quoting
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
260. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
261. Perry, supra note 251, at 1083 (“[G]overnment may not discriminate
against a person on the basis of a trait or other factor indicating nothing about the
person’s moral status.”).
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Perry writes, “It is tempting to say, in a generous if unreflective spirit
of egalitarianism, that a person’s status as an alien indicates nothing about
the worth or desert of the person.”262  But immigration status is morally
relevant to policy, he thinks, because “the members of a political commu-
nity may appropriately decide whether, to what extent, and under what
conditions persons who are not members may enter the territory of the
political community and share its resources and largesse.”263  Harold Koh
remarked that there is “something coldly compelling” about this
approach.264
But Perry is wrong.  From the perspective of the states, the very pre-
emption considerations that give rise to the preemption-only view show
that there is nothing relevant about citizenship.  The Supreme Court rec-
ognized as much in Flores de Otero, when it explained that there are two
reasons for applying strict scrutiny to noncitizens: protection of a discrete
and insular minority, and states’ lack of power over immigration-related
issues.265  When Puerto Rico argued that its anti-immigrant law was justi-
fied by its interest in preventing an influx of migrants to Puerto Rico, the
Court held that this justification was “at odds with the Federal Govern-
ment’s primary power and responsibility for the regulation of
immigration.”266
The same rationale applies to any state attempt to single out nonci-
tizens for adverse treatment: it is the federal government, not the states,
that should decide whether immigration status carries adverse conse-
quences.  Immigration is none of the states’ business.  This is the flip side
of the plenary power: if immigration is exclusively Congress’s domain,
then states can’t use immigration status to justify their policies.  As the
Court wrote in Diaz, “division by a State of the category of persons who are
not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States citizens and
262. Id. at 1061.
263. Id.
264. See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and
the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 95 (1985).
265. Flores de Otero:
The underpinnings of the Court’s constitutional decisions defining the
circumstances under which state and local governments may favor citi-
zens of this country by denying lawfully admitted aliens equal rights and
opportunities have been two.  The first, based squarely on the concepts
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, recognizes that
“(a)liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minor-
ity . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”  The
second, grounded in the Supremacy Clause, Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and in
the naturalization power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, recognizes the Federal Govern-
ment’s primary responsibility in the field of immigration and
naturalization.
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
602 (1976) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
266. Id. at 605.
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aliens has no apparent justification.”267  For states, immigration matters
are, as Condon puts it, ultra vires.268
The Supreme Court took this view in Nyquist v. Mauclet,269 in which
the challenged state law barred certain noncitizens from financial assis-
tance for higher education unless they affirmed their intent to apply for
citizenship when they became eligible.270  One of the justifications New
York offered was that its law would give noncitizens an incentive to natural-
ize.271  But this purpose, the Court held, “is not a permissible one for a
State.  Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclu-
sively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to
interfere.”272
All of these precedents establish that states have no legitimate busi-
ness trying to influence immigration policy.  But states have other policy
objectives to which immigration status could, in theory, be relevant.
For example, states do not act ultra vires when they try to ensure the
protection of the public from licensed professionals who misbehave them-
selves.  States have attempted to argue that immigration status is relevant
to these efforts.273  Perhaps people with temporary immigration status are
more likely to leave the country sooner, thus placing themselves beyond
the bounds of a state’s regulatory-enforcement powers.
The Second Circuit persuasively rejected arguments of this kind in
Dandamudi.274  To be sure, noncitizens might leave the country.  But so
might citizens.  And noncitizens might also adjust to permanent status.
There is too much uncertainty involving anyone’s future to say that states
need to use immigration status as a proxy for whether someone is likely to
stay subject to the state’s regulatory-enforcement powers.  Moreover, states
are free to use other proxies if they want; for example, if the law permits,
they could impose durational-residency requirements, or require regu-
lated professionals to deposit a bond.
As the Graham decision emphasizes, noncitizens for most purposes
are functionally identical to citizens.  “Aliens like citizens pay taxes and
may be called into the armed forces.”275  And they “may live within a state
for many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth
of the state.”276  Once we take the goal of influencing immigration policy
267. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).
268. Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 112.
269. 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
270. Id. at 2.
271. Id. at 9–10.
272. Id. at 10 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
273. Full disclosure: I articulated arguments of this kind when I briefed and
argued the Dandamudi case.
274. See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 75–77 (2d Cir. 2012).
275. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
276. Id.
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off the table for states, it is difficult to imagine any situation in which states
would have a legitimate need to take account of immigration status.
In sum, it is difficult to imagine a legitimate reason why states would
need to take account of immigration status in their policymaking.  Thus
far, the case for abolishing equal protection for noncitizens is unpersua-
sive.  We’ve seen that there is nothing gained, normatively speaking, by
allowing states to consider immigration status.  Now we should ask
whether, normatively speaking, there would be anything lost if we allowed
states to consider immigration status.  In other words, there may be no
normative reasons to allow state consideration of immigration status, but
are there normative reasons to prohibit it?
4. Equal Protection’s Anti-Subordination Function
Even if the preemptionists’ arguments were correct—if preemption
better explained existing case law, and if immigration status were morally
relevant for state policymakers—it would still be proper to apply strict
scrutiny.
While it is true that one reason to apply strict scrutiny is to prevent
states from basing policymaking on factors that are morally irrelevant, that
is only one reason for strict scrutiny.  Another reason is to protect specific
groups from subordination.277  And that reason for strict scrutiny applies
with all possible force to noncitizens.278
As the Supreme Court has written, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause was
intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and
invidious class-based legislation.”279  The concern behind equal-protection
doctrine as applied to immigration is not just that states can’t have a good
reason for discriminating against noncitizens; it’s that discrimination
against noncitizens is an especially invidious evil.
The anti-subordination rationale is well-grounded in precedent. Gra-
ham itself held that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete
and insular’ minority, for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is ap-
propriate.”280  It did not, however, explain what makes them “discrete and
insular,” noting instead that they are functionally similar to citizens:
“[a]liens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces.
Unlike the short-term residents in Shapiro, aliens may live within a state for
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of
277. On equal protection as anti-subordination, see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordi-
nation Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–10
(1986).
278. See Koh, supra note 264, at 97 (preemption analysis “recognizes no inde-
pendent constitutional norm constraining federal government discrimination
against aliens”).
279. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982); see Condon, Equal Protection Excep-
tionalism, supra note 28, at 571.
280. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
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the state.”281 Flores de Otero similarly noted that both federal power and
anti-subordination support strict scrutiny, without explaining in much de-
tail why noncitizens are a suspect class.282  So why is the class suspect?
Harold Koh, defending the necessity of equal protection, asked his
readers to imagine noncitizens’ equal-protection claims from the perspec-
tive of those noncitizens themselves: those noncitizens “rarely protest that
they have been discriminated against by the wrong level of government, or
that the President and Congress have not authorized the states to discrimi-
nate against them.”283  Instead, they have argued that they have not been
treated by the state to which they pay taxes, whose economy they support,
whose schools their children attend, and in whose cultural life they share,
with the equal regard and dignity that the state shows to others who do the
same.284
Preemption is an awkward substitute for these principles.  True, pre-
emption doctrine has sometimes been put to work to protect noncitizens
from subordination.  As Hiroshi Motomura notes, undocumented people
are frequently compelled to bring preemption claims as a way of vindicat-
ing interests that might otherwise have been protected by equal protec-
tion.285  Jennifer Chacón writes that this is particularly true in the context
of actions by state law enforcement officials, where the difficulty of ad-
dressing real concerns about discriminatory enforcement of state laws
compelled noncitizens to frame their challenges as preemption
challenges.286
But preemption doctrine doesn’t capture the basic truth that xeno-
phobia is a pervasive and profound threat.  Anti-immigrant prejudice is
real.  The President of the United States has used language that equates
undocumented immigrants with vermin: “Democrats are the problem. . . .
[t]hey don’t care about crime and want illegal immigrants, no matter how
bad they may be, to pour into and infest our Country, like MS-13 . . . .”287
Social science shows such metaphors in political rhetoric have powerful
281. Id. at 376 (quoting Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250, 253 (E.D. Pa.
1970)).
282. See supra note 260.
283. Koh, supra note 264, at 100.
284. Id. (“[T]heir complaint was that, for reasons unrelated to their qualities
as individuals, they had not been treated as members of the community to which
they thought they belonged.”).
285. Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration
Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1736 (2010) (“Given the obstacles to equal
protection claims by unauthorized migrants, preemption has become the chal-
lenge of choice, and thus the focus of judicial opinions.”).
286. Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012) (discussing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387
(2012)).
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effects, provoking feelings of disgust and bolstering anti-immigrant policy
views.288
Social scientists have documented the remarkable extent to which
anti-immigrant feelings are a driving force in U.S. politics.289  For exam-
ple, feelings about immigration motivate switches in party affiliation from
Democrat to Republican in a way that feelings about other political issues
do not.290  And when localities create laws or polices that are hostile to
noncitizens’ interests, it is political partisanship, rather than demographic
change, that best accounts for that decision.291  Indeed, as Condon notes,
the history of American xenophobia is evident in decisions of the Su-
preme Court which are themselves examples of anti-immigrant
prejudice.292  The plenary-power doctrine originated in Chae Chan Ping,
which grounded its reasoning on racist fantasies about the need to protect
the country from “vast hordes” of foreign nationals.293  Equal-protection
doctrine, as Koh writes, “guards against state discrimination against resi-
dent aliens based on careless or unthinking stereotyping.”294  Such stere-
otyping plays a dramatic role in immigration policymaking today.295  As
long as it does, strict scrutiny will be necessary.
288. Tom Jacobs, How Metaphor Can Be a Potent Tool in Fostering Anti-Immigrant
Sentiment, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-
our-political-language-provokes-anti-immigrant-anger [https://perma.cc/SQ62-
NG8T] (discussing Shantal R. Marshall & Jenessa R. Shapiro, When “Scurry” vs.
“Hurry” Makes the Difference: Vermin Metaphors, Disgust, and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes,
74 J. SOC. ISSUES 774 (2018)).
289. See MARISA ABRAJANO AND ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, WHITE BACKLASH: IMMIGRA-
TION, RACE, AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2015).
290. Id. at 88–112.
291. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Feder-
alism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2107 (2013).
292. Condon, Equal Protection Exceptionalism, supra note 8, at 597–98 (citing
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 726 (1893)).
293. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
294. Koh, supra note 264, at 93.  Moreover, preemption doctrine can cut both
ways: the same preemption principles that supported a challenge to anti-immi-
grant legislation in Arizona can be used to challenge state pro-immigrant policies,
like “sanctuary” policies. See Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The
Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367,
375 (2013).  Interestingly, a note in the Yale Law Journal suggests that preemption
would be more protective of undocumented people than equal protection. State
Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, supra note 242, at 953 (“Fi-
nally, federal preemption would supersede any attempts by states to regulate illegal
aliens.  Although there obviously has been no congressional decision to admit ille-
gal aliens, illegal immigration so profoundly affects American foreign relations
that any regulatory approach must yield to the superior federal interest.”).  The
note also suggests that under preemption analysis, states could not exclude nonci-
tizens from teaching in public schools, even though the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Equal Protection Clause to allow their exclusions from those jobs. Id. at
956; see Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979).
295. See Ming Hsu Chen, Leveraging Social Science Expertise in Immigration Poli-
cymaking, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 281 (2018).
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One objection to this line of argument is to demand why, if anti-sub-
ordination is the purpose of the doctrine, strict scrutiny does not also ap-
ply to the federal government when it discriminates against noncitizens.
Of course, it is a conceptual necessity that noncitizens be treated differ-
ently from citizens when the federal government makes immigration law,
that is, when it regulates admission and removal.  Otherwise everyone
would be a citizen.  But it is possible to imagine a world in which strict
scrutiny applies to federal alienage law—that is, laws governing the treat-
ment of noncitizens during their stay.  If the purpose of strict scrutiny is
anti-subordination, why is federal discrimination against noncitizens (in
the context of alien law) any less offensive to the Constitution?
One answer, of course, is that it isn’t, and that we should apply strict
scrutiny to federal discrimination in alienage law.  Another answer is that
federal discrimination against noncitizens is no less offensive to the Con-
stitution, but must be accepted for reasons of judicial deference.
The plenary power, according to Koh, is not really a power at all.296
It’s a doctrine of judicial deference, not equal protection.  On this theory,
federal discrimination against noncitizens receives deferential review “not
because federal alienage discrimination is any less offensive to the substan-
tive norm guiding the court’s review, but because the countervailing con-
siderations insulating that federal conduct from judicial review are
significantly greater.”297  Courts must allow federal discrimination against
noncitizens not because it is inoffensive, but because it has foreign-policy
implications that are beyond courts’ competence, or because immigration
is fundamental to national sovereignty and must therefore be consigned to
the Executive Branch, or some such reason.
If federal discrimination against noncitizens is just as offensive to the
Constitution’s substantive values as discrimination by states, then there is
no inconsistency to resolve: the anti-subordination rational applies to all
instances of discrimination against noncitizens, even if courts do not al-
ways have the power to stop it.
Whatever position we take on federal discrimination against nonci-
tizens, the normative case for equal protection of noncitizens against state
discrimination is clear.  The anti-subordination rationale is strong, and
completely independent of the federal-power rationale for strict scrutiny.
We’ve seen, then, that Supreme Court precedents don’t support the
preemption-only view.  We’ve also seen that there is no good reason to
allow states to discriminate against noncitizens, because immigration isn’t
their business.  And, finally, we’ve seen that there are very good reasons to
bar states from discrimination, because the Equal Protection Clause aims
to stop the subordination of groups like noncitizens.  Put together, these
considerations make a compelling case for the application of strict scru-
296. Koh, supra note 264, at 99.
297. Id.
56
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/1
2020] DISCRIMINATORY COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 57
tiny to noncitizens.  The next section applies this analysis to discriminatory
cooperative federalism.
C. Strict Scrutiny Should Apply Whenever States Have a Choice
The previous section left us with two rationales for strict scrutiny.  The
first is ensuring that states don’t justify their policies with morally irrele-
vant factors.  The second is preventing subordination.  The question, then,
is to what extent these rationales require the application of strict scrutiny
to actions that states take as part of discriminatory-cooperative-federalism
schemes.  This section will argue that both rationales militate in favor of
applying strict scrutiny whenever states have discretion.  And so do other
concerns.
1. The Rationales for Strict Scrutiny Apply to Discriminatory Cooperative-
Federalism Schemes
As the previous section explained, there are two reasons for the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to congressionally supported state discrimination
against noncitizens.  The first is ensuring that states don’t justify their poli-
cies with morally irrelevant factors.  The second is preventing subordina-
tion of noncitizens.
It can be argued that federal approval undercuts the first reason for
strict scrutiny.  The first reason, remember, is that immigration-related
considerations are not the states’ business.  If the federal government ap-
proves of states making immigration their business, then this rationale ar-
guably no longer applies.  With federal approval, immigration status ceases
to be morally irrelevant.
This argument only works to the extent that the federal government
has the power to make immigration the states’ business.  All of the argu-
ments above about the limits on Congress’s power (the uniformity and anti-
delegation arguments) come into play here.  If non-uniformity in immi-
gration rules threatens foreign relations, for example, then Congress
should not have the power to give states discretion and create a patchwork
of laws affecting noncitizens.298  Likewise, there is good reason not to ap-
ply the plenary-power doctrine, under which the federal government is
entitled to deferential equal-protection review, to federal statutes that try
to support state discrimination.  The state laws we are discussing do not
involve entry and removal, the topics of what is sometimes called “immi-
gration law,” as opposed to “alienage law.”  There are therefore good rea-
sons to limit the plenary power in this area, and doing so makes more
sense than extending that plenary power to states acting under the um-
298. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (“It is fundamental
that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their na-
tionals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this sub-
ject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.” (citing Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1876)).
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brella of congressional support.  So the first justification for strict scrutiny
still stands: states should not be allowed to discriminate on the basis of
immigration status because nothing makes immigration status the states’
business.
And the second justification for strict scrutiny is not affected in the
least by federal approval.  Noncitizens, who cannot vote, are undoubtedly
the subject of irrational bias.  The anti-subordination rationale for strict
scrutiny is not diminished by federal approval of state discrimination.  To
be sure, the federal government itself has the power to discriminate with-
out passing strict scrutiny, but (as argued above) this does not make the
discrimination any less problematic.
Even if it were true that congressional support for state discrimination
puts the two rationales for strict scrutiny into conflict, there is no reason to
think that the two rationales are an either/or proposition.  Rather, both
rationales address separate concerns: that states will act without justifica-
tion, and that states will subordinate politically disempowered groups.
Where one rationale is not present, but the other is, strict scrutiny should
nonetheless apply.
As an alternative to looking at the reasons why scrutiny is sometimes
strict, we might look at the reasons for why scrutiny is sometimes relaxed,
to see if they apply to discriminatory cooperative federalism.  As Gerald
Neuman writes, “Congressional discrimination receives deference because
it is presumed to reflect the weighing of factors that the states are neither
likely nor constitutionally competent to assess.”299  But these reasons for
deference don’t apply once Congress punts decisions about discrimina-
tion to the states: “Congress’s abdication of the eligibility issue to the states
would demonstrate that these considerations of foreign policy and na-
tional sovereignty do not require ineligibility for state benefits.”300
Supreme Court precedent confirms that strict scrutiny should apply
regardless of whether Congress purports to authorize state discrimination.
As Condon points out, the Supreme Court answered this question in 1969
in a related context, when it struck down a state requirement that welfare
applicants have resided in the state for a certain amount of time.301  Con-
gress had created a statutory framework which appeared to authorize a
one-year residence requirement.302  The Supreme Court said, “even if we
were to assume, arguendo, that Congress did approve the imposition of a
299. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187,
and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1439 (1995).
300. Id.
301. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969), overruled in part on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Condon, Equal Protection for
Immigrants, supra note 2, at 132 n.221.
302. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 645 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Congress in-
tended to authorize state residence requirements of up to one year.”).
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one-year waiting period, it is the responsive state legislation which in-
fringes constitutional rights.”303
The Court explained that the federal statute “[b]y itself” had “abso-
lutely no restrictive effect.”304  Thus, it was “not that statute but only the
state requirements which pose the constitutional question.”305  And “Con-
gress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.”306
2. Practical Reasons for Strict Scrutiny
There are also strong practical reasons to apply strict scrutiny to state
discrimination even when it has congressional support.  One such reason
is accountability, a concern often raised with cooperative-federalism
schemes.307  When Congress and the states work together on a program, it
can be challenging for voters to know whom to hold accountable.308
Whether or not this concern is a compelling one (in light of voters’ gen-
eral lack of awareness of which policymakers bear responsibility for any
given decision), it has been embraced by the Supreme Court, particularly
in its commandeering cases.309  And it would be relatively easy to articu-
late accountability concerns about the discriminatory cooperative federal-
ism schemes described in this Article.  In those schemes, remember,
Congress makes discrimination against a politically disempowered group
possible not by mandating it, but by giving states a choice.  That’s already
opaque to voters: whose fault is the discrimination?  But the accountability
problem becomes much worse if Congress’s grant of discretion has the
incidental effect of radically altering the level of scrutiny that will be ap-
plied by the courts.  Now the fault belongs to Congress, and the states, and
the judges, and perhaps the Constitution itself.  If the only way Congress
can cause state discrimination is by mandating it, voters will at least know
whom to hold accountable.310
Another practical reason is workability.  Remember that Judge Bybee,
and others who think equal-protection analysis should be replaced by pre-
emption doctrine, argue that equal-protection doctrine has too many ex-
ceptions to be workable.311  Their solution to this problem is to abolish




307. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
308. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813,
826 (1998) (noting that the accountability concerns invoked in the Supreme
Court’s anti-commandeering cases seem to apply equally to all cases of cooperative
federalism).
309. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
310. Carrasco notes that this would force elected representatives in Congress
to make the difficult decision.  Carrasco, supra note 2, at 628.
311. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring).
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the doctrine entirely, so that noncitizens are no longer constitutionally
protected against discrimination.  As discussed above, there isn’t much
reason to see this as a real problem; there are exceptions to strict scrutiny
for undocumented people; for public employment where the employee
will serve a political function; and (according to two circuits) for people
with temporary visas.312  It seems early to declare this doctrine too riddled
with holes to survive.  But if we are sincerely concerned about keeping
things simple, we may as well not create a new exception for cases in which
the federal government has expressed approval of the discrimination at
issue.
Aside from the practical concerns, there are also separation-of-powers
issues with any scheme in which Congress can immunize state action from
judicial scrutiny.  As Roger Hartley writes, “The intended legal effect of
PRWORA’s devolution provisions is to render lawful some state welfare-
eligibility policies that the judiciary otherwise would hold are
unconstitutional.”313
So the arguments against relaxing scrutiny are strong.  Interestingly,
even Judge Bybee, whose views on the subject are so extreme that he wants
to do away with equal-protection scrutiny of anti-immigrant discrimination
altogether, concedes that if it weren’t for preemption principles, congres-
sional authorization wouldn’t suffice to defend against an equal-protec-
tion claim.314  “[W]hatever reasons the federal government may offer for
its own discrimination policy,” he writes, “the states cannot rely on that
same justification.”315  “The states must supply their own sovereign rea-
sons and cannot cite the reasons of a coordinate government.”316
D. What Level of Discretion Triggers Strict Scrutiny?
Now that we’ve made a case for applying strict scrutiny, it’s time to
circle back to the observation made early in the Article about the ways in
which “discretion” is in fact a spectrum.  Discriminatory cooperative feder-
alism is not one kind of scheme, but many, and some of these schemes
give states more discretion than others.  So the last problem, once we’ve
decided to apply strict scrutiny to cases of discretion, is to decide exactly
how far Congress can restrict states’ choices before discretion becomes an
illusion.  So the Article will end by drawing boundaries around the analysis
312. Two circuits have created an exception for temporary noncitizens too.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir.
2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2005), hearing en banc de-
nied, 444 F.3d 428; Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
313. Hartley, supra note 2, at 102.
314. Korab, 797 F.3d at 597–98 (Bybee, J., concurring) (“In sum, if we looked
exclusively to equal-protection principles, I think it is likely that Hawai’i’s law
would fall.”).
315. Id. at 597 (Bybee, J., concurring).
316. Id. (Bybee, J., concurring).
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it’s been working to develop: at a certain point, we’re no longer talking
about cooperative federalism at all.
Specifying the conditions under which strict scrutiny should apply will
be more complicated than most commentators have yet seen.  As Part I
explained, above, federal statutes that support state discrimination against
noncitizens take numerous forms.  Some statutes purport to “authorize”
discrimination, while others purport to allow states to discriminate pro-
vided they meet certain conditions.  Assuming the arguments above are
correct, and strict scrutiny applies to at least some of these statutes, to
which should it apply?
Nobody (so far as I’m aware) has argued that strict scrutiny should
apply when the federal government uses its preemption power to outright
require a denial of benefits.317  The question, then, is what level of scru-
tiny applies when states have some measure of freedom to choose whether
to discriminate.318
We should begin with the test adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Finch, which asked whether the federal law “deprives
the Commonwealth of autonomy and renders [the state policy] something
other than an action undertaken solely by the Commonwealth.”319  The
test for discretion, then, is whether federal law mandates the state policy; if
not, strict scrutiny applies.  “Where the State is left with a range of options
including discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, its selection
amongst those options must be reviewed under the standards applicable to
the State and not those applicable to Congress.”320
How are we to judge whether a state has truly been left with “a range
of options?”  As Richard Posner once wrote, it is possible to make “dichot-
omous cuts in continuous phenomena.”321  At some point, federal law
constrains state discretion so heavily that states effectively cease to have a
choice. Finch recognized this possibility, discussing federal financial incen-
tives under the Welfare Reform Act and finding “no principled basis for
concluding increased expense somehow deprives the Commonwealth of
autonomy.”322  With the power to not discriminate comes the responsibil-
ity to not discriminate.
One question that arises when we try to apply this analysis is how to
treat situations where Congress imposes a requirement of discrimination
317. Rosenberg comes closest, arguing that states could simply choose to fund
their own programs for aliens to stand alongside a joint-funded program. Rosen-
berg, supra note 2, at 1458–59; id. at 1465–68.  But that’s not true in the case of a
direct prohibition on state-provided benefits.
318. For an analysis of the level of scrutiny that should apply to joint federal/
state programs, see Wurzburg, supra note 2.
319. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 655,
674 n.19 (2011).
320. Id. at 674.
321. RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 46 (1993).
322. Finch, 459 Mass. at 274 n.19.
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as a condition of participation in Medicaid.  To withdraw from Medicaid
would impose an immense burden on people within a state and on the
state government itself.  But the analysis above suggests that strict scrutiny
applies whenever states have a choice.  States have a choice about whether
to participate in Medicaid.323  Must states then choose between withdraw-
ing from Medicaid altogether, and creating a supplemental program to
make up for the funds denied to noncitizens?
The First Circuit has concluded that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause
does not place the state in such a Procrustean bed.”324  The court ac-
knowledged that “Congress discriminated” in the Welfare Reform Act, but
held that this “does not also establish alienage-based discrimination by
Maine merely because of its continued Medicaid participation and re-
quired compliance with [the act].”325  If the state wasn’t discriminating by
choosing to participate in a discriminatory scheme, then what was it do-
ing?  “[I]f Maine can be said to have ‘discriminated’ at all, it only did so on
the basis of federal Medicaid eligibility, a benign classification subject to
mere rational basis review.”326
This is pretty unsatisfying.  Imagine that the Republic of Scarti, a
wealthy island off the coast of the United States with a racist government,
creates a program to support Americans in coastal areas affected by natu-
ral disasters, offering matching funds to state governments that help peo-
ple rebuild their homes.  The grants will be administered by the states.
There is only one condition: the Scartian funds can only be used to help
white people.  In accepting the Scartian funds, a state is arguably discrimi-
nating not on the basis of race but on the basis of eligibility for Scartian
funds.  But this doesn’t make the practice any less objectionable.
In general, then, states can’t excuse their own discriminatory actions
by saying they were merely participating in a cooperative-federalism
scheme.  Participation in such schemes is a choice.  To be sure, states
often benefit financially from participation in such schemes; that’s how
Spending Clause programs work.  But it’s no excuse to say that foregoing
participation in the cooperative-federalism scheme would cost the state
money.  As Condon writes, “Graham treated citizens and lawful permanent
residents similarly situated based upon their shared contributions and bur-
dens of community membership, not a comparative economic assessment
of what it would cost to treat them equally.”327
323. Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (“The fact that Maine
voluntarily participated in Medicaid does not alter our analysis. By the appellants’
logic, Maine’s continued voluntary participation in Medicaid and compliance with
PRWORA violated the Equal Protection Clause, requiring the state to either with-
draw from Medicaid altogether or to create an equivalent state-funded medical
assistance benefit for PRWORA-ineligible aliens.”).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 70; see Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 659 (Conn. 2011); cf.
Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255–56.
327. Condon, Equal Protection for Immigrants, supra note 2, at 139.
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Still, some choices are more free than others.  There may be situa-
tions where the federal government exerts enormous economic pressure
on states in a way that effectively forces them to participate in a discrimina-
tory program.  In such cases, courts have strongly resisted claims that when
a state participates in a discriminatory federal scheme, it takes on an obli-
gation to provide equivalent benefits to the noncitizens who are left out.
As we’ve seen, the First Circuit objected to the idea that participation
in Medicaid could carry with it an obligation to separately fund programs
for noncitizens that match what Medicaid denies them.  Perhaps one rea-
son for the court’s objection was that the cost of not participating in Medi-
caid is so high.  The program is gargantuan, accounting for more than a
quarter of state budgets.328  Perhaps it simply seemed unfair to force the
state to create a new program on the side as a condition of allowing it to
participate in Medicaid because Medicaid is so important that it’s func-
tionally not optional.
This is the far end of the discretion spectrum: situations in which state
discretion comes under heavy pressure from the federal government.  Re-
call that two major kinds of cooperative federalism take the form of a car-
rot and a stick.329  Congress can induce state participation in federal
schemes by offering funds to states that join them, or by threatening to
preempt states that don’t.  These inducements can be more or less heavy-
handed.
When Congress threatens preemption, it can make it easy for states to
avoid preemption, or all but impossible.  One provision of the Welfare
Reform Act says that states can’t give public benefits to undocumented
immigrants unless the state’s legislature specifically passes a statute author-
izing the benefits.  In other words, states are preempted unless their legis-
lature acts.  This is a high bar to clear; legislative action doesn’t come
easily.330
Similarly, when Congress offers funds to incentivize state participa-
tion in cooperative-federalism schemes, it can be more or less heavy-
handed.  In several of the cases discussed above, Congress imposed a re-
quirement of discrimination on states as a condition of their participation
in Medicaid.  The Supreme Court has told us that Medicaid is such a huge
component of states’ budgets that it’s unconstitutionally coercive for Con-
gress to threaten to kick states out of the Medicaid program.331  “Do X or
lose your Medicaid funding,” in other words, isn’t a real choice at all.
328. Medicaid’s Share of State Budgets, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT ACCESS
COMM’N (MACPAC), https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-
budgets/ [https://perma.cc/PY8B-VYM5].
329. See supra note 34.
330. I’ve argued elsewhere that this provision imposes a burden that isn’t just
hard to clear, but also intrusive in constitutionally impermissible ways.  Ayers, supra
note 43.
331. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–05 (2012).
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This, then, is the answer to arguments that states have no meaningful
choice but to participate in a discriminatory federal program.  If states
really have no choice at all, they are being coerced, and Congress has ex-
ceeded its Spending Clause authority.  If states do have a choice, then the
program is not just a federal program but also a state program, and they
have a concomitant obligation to make sure that the program does not
discriminate by providing, without federal support, benefits for the nonci-
tizens who are left out.
A similar answer will suffice to deal with concerns about the “stick”
side of cooperative federalism.  If a state is given a choice between discrim-
inating and being preempted, the question for courts is whether the
choice is a meaningful one.  If so, strict scrutiny applies.  In some cases,
the choice may be illusory.  For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1621 preempts any
state action that gives benefits to noncitizens unless the state legislature
passes a statute specifically authorizing it.332  As I’ve argued in a previous
article, that’s unconstitutionally intrusive on state sovereignty, because it’s
none of Congress’s business which branch of state government decides
whether noncitizens should get benefits.333  So this statute doesn’t provide
a meaningful choice, and states shouldn’t be subject to strict scrutiny for
whatever choice they make under it.  As long as states do have a choice,
however, strict scrutiny should apply.
In sum, when we examine all of these complicated questions about
how to analyze the state role in cooperative-federalism schemes, we come
back to a relatively simple answer.  As long as states have a meaningful
choice, strict scrutiny applies.
CONCLUSION
Cooperative-federalism schemes involve two actors, each of whom is
subject to their own constraints.  So it’s not necessary to develop a unified
theory of what’s problematic about cooperative-federalism schemes that
aim to encourage discrimination.  Those schemes can be challenged in
multiple ways.
This Article has outlined four major challenges to cooperative-feder-
alism schemes that result in discrimination against noncitizens.  Three of
those challenges are aimed at the federal government’s actions, and one
of them (though it is the most complicated) aims at the state’s actions.  It
is important to note, though, that other challenges may be available.  Be-
cause states play a role in cooperative-federalism schemes, challenges can
be made under whatever distinctive provisions exist in the relevant state’s
constitution.  And of course the federal statute at issue may be subject to
creative interpretation that undermines the attempt to discriminate.
The upshot of all this is that while cooperative-federalism schemes
may seem to federal legislators a good way to encourage discrimination
332. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2018).
333. Ayers, supra note 43.
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without shouldering the blame for it (because states, after all, take the
final step that actually denies benefits to noncitizens), those schemes in
fact make possible a variety of challenges that would not be available if
Congress had simply effected the discrimination itself.  The tools of dis-
criminatory cooperative federalism examined in this Article may have
seemed, to Congress, like shortcuts around various legal and political
roadblocks.  But for every shortcut, there is a cogent legal challenge wait-
ing to be made.
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